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THE MAINE CLEAN ELECTION ACT: THE FUTURE OF
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
Michael E. Canpion*
INTRODUCTION

One need only open a newspaper to discover the prevalence of

campaign finance abuses.1 Campaign finance abuses, however, do

much more than provide notable headlines. Indeed, the current campaign financing system undermines our system of representative democracy.2 In particular, it encourages legislators to ignore their
constituents and their duties,3 gives "special interests" disproportional
influence,4 and discourages qualified candidates from running.-

Politicians ignore their constituents and their public duties because
they must spend an inordinate amount of time chasing campaign
money.6 Indeed, as campaigns have become increasingly expensive,
candidates spend more and more time fund-raising. 7 When elected,

legislators immediately begin raising money for their next campaign
because they must raise thousands of dollars a week to remain com-

petitive.8 As a result, they devote less time and energy to the duties of
public office and to their constituents.9
* This Note is dedicated to my parents, to my sister, Caroline. and to Jenn.

1. See, e.g., Jill Abramson, Editorial, Money Buys a Lot More Than Access, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 9, 1997, § 4, at 4 (describing campaign abuses by members of both parties); Don Terry, Democratic Fund-Raiser Pleads Guilry to Fraud and Conspiracy.
N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1998, at A18 (reporting a democratic fund-raiser's plea of guilty
to campaign fund-raising abuses).
2. See, e.g., Marty Jezer & Ellen Miller, Money Politics: Campaign Finance and
the Subversion of American Democracy, 8 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 467,
467-71 (1994) (explaining that private financing of campaigns leads to a subversion of
American democracy).
3. Clean Money Campaign Reform (visited Mar. 8, 1998)
<http:l
xvwv.publicampaign.org/cleanmoney.html> [hereinafter Clean Money Campaign Reform]. This web site was created by Public Campaign which is a "non-profit, nonpartisan organization dedicated to taking special-interest money out of America's
elections." Public Campaign: OrganizationalProfile (visited Mar. 8, 1998) <http'//
www.publicampaign.org/who.html>. Public Campaign is working to "build a network
of state-based efforts into a powerful national force for federal reform." Id.
4. Jezer & Miller, supra note 2, at 470-71.
5. Richard L. Berke, Run for Congress? PartiesFind Rising Stars Are Just Saying
No, N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1998, § 1, at 1 (reporting that many candidates choose not to
run due to the high cost of campaigning).
6. Clean Money Campaign Refonn, supra note 3.
7. David B. Magleby & Candice J. Nelson, The Money Chase: Congressional
Campaign Finance Reform 44 (1990).
8. See Kenneth J. Levit, Campaign Finance Reform and the Return of Buckley v.
Valeo, 103 Yale LJ. 469, 475 (1993) (noting that the spiraling costs of campaigns requires candidates to raise thousands of dollars a week).
9. Clean Money Campaign Refonn, supra note 3.
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Many candidates rely heavily on special interest money as a source
of campaign funds. 10 Hoping to gain influence, special interests, usually wealthy organizations and individuals, gladly supply legislators
and prospective legislators with money. 1 Legislators often respond
by tailoring their politics to please the special interests.12 Indeed,
when special interests funnel large sums of money into campaigns,
many candidates feel bound to represent the contributors' interests
lest they lose their source of special interest money in the future.' 3
This "influence-peddling" disrupts our representative system, as many
candidates inevitably place their wealthy contributors' interests above
their constituents' interests. 4 Indeed, monied interests play a greater
role in forming legislators' agenda because their constituents have less
access to and influence with the candidates than do special interests.,5

Reformers point to scores of examples of trading money for legislative favors,

6

and even legislators note that special interest money

leads to political quid pro quo"' and a distortion of representative democracy.' 8 One former legislator complained that "[i]t is not 'we the
people,' but ... monied interests who are setting the nation's agenda

and are influencing the position of candidates on the important is-

sues." 19 Another legislator acknowledged that "[w]e are the only

human beings in the world who are expected to take thousands of
dollars from perfect strangers and not be affected by it."" ° Yet another legislator admitted that "[f]or campaign funds, you must endear
10. See Jezer & Miller, supra note 2, at 470.
11. See id. at 470-72; see also Jill Abramson, Tobacco Industry Steps Up Flow of
Campaign Money, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1998, § 1, at 1 (noting that the tobacco industry, which seeks favorable legislation, donated millions of dollars to candidates in a
non-election year).
12. See Jezer & Miller, supra note 2, at 479-80 (noting that legislators who supported subsidies to sugar growers received substantial contributions from the Sugar
PAC).
13. See id. at 470-72.
14. See Larry J. Sabato & Glenn Simpson, Dirty Little Secrets: The Persistence of
Corruption in American Politics 7 (1996) (noting that influence-peddling has become
worse over time); Jezer & Miller, supra note 2, at 467-85 (documenting that monied
interests disrupt American democracy).
15. See Sabato & Simpson, supra note 14, at 7-10. Moreover, because many special interest contributors come from outside the candidate's district, many legislators
end up representing the interests of those thousands of miles away from the legislator's constituents. See Note, "Foreign" Campaign Contributionsand the FirstAmendment, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1886 (1997).
16. See Sabato & Simpson, supra note 14, at 49-82 (discussing examples of trading
influence for campaign contributions).
17. Political quid pro quo consists of trading legislative favors for campaign contributions. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976).
18. See Jezer & Miller, supra note 2, at 474-75 (citing legislators' viewpoints regarding the distortion of representation by the current system of campaign financing).
19. Philip M. Stern, The Best Congress Money Can Buy 194 (1988) (quoting Senator Barry Goldwater).
20. Paul Taylor, Lobbyists' Success at Raising Funds Proves Costly, Wash. Post,
Aug. 2, 1983, at Al (quoting Congressman Barney Frank).
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yourself to the appropriate monied groups.
Almost always, that
21
means voting... to aid those groups. 1
The prevalence of money in campaigns further undermines our
democratic system by limiting electoral choices.' Because only those
who can quickly accumulate sufficient resources can run an effective
campaign, many candidates choose not to run.' Indeed, many highly
qualified potential candidates abstain from running because they have
little access to lucrative funding and24 do not wish to get entangled in
the special interest "money chase.
Despite a loud call for change in this system, Congress has failed to
pass meaningful campaign finance reform' and continually spurns
bills that would restructure the system. Most recently, several influential law makers effectively defeated this year's version of campaign
finance reform: the McCain-Feingold bill. -b
Cynics claim that few should be surprised that Congress refuses to
pass meaningful reform. After all, why should politicians abolish a
system which keeps them in power? 27 To maintain their interests, politicians merely embrace "business as usual."
The people of Maine, however, have disrupted politicians' usual
business. In response to campaign abuses and legislative inaction, the
citizens of Maine passed "The Maine Clean Election Act" (the "Act")
a comprehensive campaign finance reform initiative.'z This Act provides candidates with full public financing if they voluntarily limit
their spending and reject all contributions. 29 With this Act, the citizens of Maine seek to quash campaign abuses and restore equality to
the electoral process.3 0
Maine's successful ballot initiative energized and focused similar reform efforts in over a dozen states.3 1 Vermont was the first to follow
Maine with a similar "Clean Money" statute.3 - Other similar bills are
moving though the legislatures of North Carolina, Illinois, Wisconsin,
21. Cec Heftel, Editorial, To Achieve CampaignFinance Reform, Destroy the Corrupt Culture of Congress, (visited Mar. 8, 1998) <http'J/www.publicampaign.org
edl.html> (discussing his experiences as a member of the U.S. House of

Representatives).

22. See Magleby & Nelson, supra note 7,at 44; Berke, supra note 5.
23. Berke, supra note 5.

24. Id
26.

25. Doug Ireland, Clean Out the Vote, Village Voice (New York), Mar. 17, 1998, at
26. Alison Mitchell, G.O.P. Defections Delay House Vote on Campaign Bill, N.Y.

Times, Mar. 27, 1998, at Al (describing procedural maneuvers used to avoid a vote on
this bill in the House and Senate).
27. Jezer & Miller, supra note 2, at 495.
28. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 21-A. §§ 1121-1128 (West Supp. 1997).

29. Id
30. Id.

31. Clean Money Campaign Reform, supra note 3. Such states include Vermont

and Massachusetts.

32. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, §§ 2851-2856 (Michie Supp. 1997).
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and Hawaii.33 Meanwhile, pending referenda in New York City, Massachusetts, Arizona, and Missouri have strong support.34 In dozens of
other states, several grass-roots organizations have begun to lobby for
reform similar to the Maine Act.35
This Note discusses the First Amendment issues surrounding the
Maine Clean Election Act. Part I examines the Act's provisions and
its underlying policies. Part II discusses First Amendment issues and
case law concerning campaign finance reform, specifically focusing on
voluntary expenditure limitations, public financing, and contribution
limitations. Lastly, Part III analyzes the Act's constitutionality. In
particular, Part III examines opponents' First Amendment challenges
to the Act and concludes that the Act does not violate the First
Amendment. In fact, Part III finds that the Maine Act promotes
rather than inhibits First Amendment principles.
I. THE MAINE CLEAN ELECTION ACT
Part I provides an overview of the Maine Clean Election Act. It
examines both the background of the Act and specific provisions
within the Act, as well as the policies underlying those provisions.
A. Background of the Act
In November 1996, the citizens of Maine passed an initiative which
enacted the most comprehensive and far reaching campaign finance
reform act in the nation.3 6 These citizens were wiser than many politicians. While many previous reforms across the nation were struck
down as violating First Amendment rights,37 the drafters of this act,
the Maine Clean Election Act,3 8 designed it to fit within constitutional
limits.3 9 Indeed, they wrote this act with an eye on the constitutional
limits outlined by the U.S. Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo.4 °
33. Ireland, supra note 25.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Steve Campbell, Maine's Campaign Finance Law Becoming National Model,
Portland Press Herald, September 18, 1997, at 8A; Grant Moos, States Look to Public
Campaign Financing to Clean Up Election System, West's Legal News, July 29, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 419511.
37. See, e.g., National Black Police Assoc. v. District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics, 924 F. Supp. 270 (D.D.C 1996) (holding that a $50 contribution limit
to candidates for local offices violated the First Amendment), vacated as moot, 108
F.3d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Bang v. Chase, 442 F. Supp. 758, 762 (D. Minn. 1977)
(holding that independent expenditure limits in an election for state senator violated

the First Amendment).
38. The Maine Clean Election Act consists of Maine Revised Statutes Annotated
title 21-A, §§ 1001-1020A and §§ 1121-1128.
39. Joel Bleifuss, Cleaning Up Elections, In These Times, May 12, 1997, at 12:
Moos, supra note 36.
40. 424 U.S. 1 (1976); see Bleifuss, supra note 39, at 12.
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By passage of the Maine Clean Election Act, the citizens of Maine
hope to diminish the "evils" that plague current campaign financing
practices. 4 ' In particular, they seek to reduce corruption, prevent
wealthy individuals and organizations from "buying influence" with
legislators, remove the enormous time constraints placed on candidates to fund-raise,4 2 and level the financial playing field among candidates.43 The following section examines the Act's provisions which
address these concerns.
B.

Specific Provisions

Beginning in 2000, the Act permits qualified candidates to voluntarily participate in the nation's first fully-funded public financing of
state election campaigns." As discussed below, the Act: 1) supplies
full funding for primary and general elections4" conditioned upon the
participant's agreement to limit expenditures and accept no contributions;' 2) provides additional public funding if non-participating candidates or their supporters spend above the participating candidates'
spending limits;4 7 and 3) limits the amount a contributor may give to

privately financed candidates.'
1. Voluntary Public Financing Conditioned Upon
Expenditure Limitations
The Act establishes a system of public financing for state legislative
and gubernatorial elections.4 9 Candidates are not required to participate in the public financing program; 0 it is merely an "alternative
campaign
financing option" in which candidates may voluntarily enlist.5 ' Participating candidates receive full funding for both primary
and general elections.5" In exchange for the public funding of their
campaigns, participating candidates agree not to accept any campaign
41. See Campbell, supra note 36.
42. See id.; Editorial, Sign up for Clean Elections, Boston Globe, Oct. 24, 1997, at
A18; see also Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protectionand the Wealth Primary,
11 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 273, 276 (1993) (discussing "well-heeled interests... [buying]
political influence" with legislators).
43. Kenneth N. Weine, Triggering the First Amendment. Why Campaign Finance
Systems thatInclude "Triggers" are Constitutional,24 Notre Dame J. of Legis. 223,224
(1998).
44. Sue O'Brien, Editorial, Seduce When You Can't Compel, Denver Post, Dec. 8,
1996, at G1.
45. See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 21-A, § 1125(7)-(9) (\Vest Supp. 1997).

46. Id. § 1125(6).
47. Id. § 1125(9).
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. § 1015.
Id. § 1123.
See id.
Id.
Id. § 1125(7)-(9).
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contributions. Moreover, those candidates must comply with a strict
ceiling on campaign expenditures. 3
If candidates choose to participate, they must meet certain qualifying criteria. 4 To qualify, participating candidates must first file a declaration of intent. Next, they must solicit a set number of five dollar

"qualifying" donations from registered voters.56 Gubernatorial candidates must solicit more "qualifying"
donations than candidates run57
ning in non-statewide races.
While attempting to raise the "qualifying" contributions, participating candidates may accept "seed" contributions. 8 Seed contributions,
which are limited to $100 per contributor, 59 enable a candidate to

gather enough resources to effectively solicit the "qualifying" contri-

butions.6" For instance, candidates may use the seed money to adver-

tise their bids or implement a drive to garner qualifying contributions.
A candidate may not collect or spend seed contributions after qualifying, and these seed contributions are subject to strict limitations.61
After candidates receive enough "qualifying" donations, they give
those donations to a state fund.6 2 Once they submit the requisite
amount of donations, candidates become certified "Clean Election
53. Id. § 1125(6).
54. Id. § 1125(1), (3)-(4).
55. Id. § 1125(1). The statute provides:
Declaration of intent. A participating candidate must file a declaration of
intent to seek certification as a Maine Clean Election Act candidate and to
comply with the requirements of this chapter.... A participating candidate
must submit a declaration of intent prior to collecting qualifying contributions under this chapter.
Id.
56. Id. § 1122(7); see id. § 1125(3). The statute provides:
Qualifying contributions. Participating candidates must obtain qualifying
contributions during the qualifying period as follows:
A. For a gubernatorial candidate, at least 2,500 verified registered voters of
this State must support the candidacy by providing a qualifying contribution
to that candidate;
B. For a candidate for the State Senate, at least 150 verified registered voters
from the candidate's electoral division must support the candidacy by providing a qualifying contribution to that candidate; or
C. For a candidate for the State House of Representatives, at least 50 verified registered voters from the candidate's electoral division must support
the candidacy by providing a qualifying contribution to that candidate.
Id.
57. See id.
58. Id. § 1122(9).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. §§ 1122(9), 1125(2). Including the candidates themselves, contributors may
donate up to $100 per person. Id. § 1122(9). Gubernatorial candidates may receive up
to $50,000 in seed money; State Senate candidates may receive up to $1,500, and State
House of Representatives may receive up to $500. Id. § 1125(2).
62. Id. § 1125(4). This fund provides money to all certified candidates. See id.
§ 1125(7)-(9). The fund receives most of its finances from taxes, including a "checkoff" on state income taxes. Id. § 1124(2).
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Once certified, candidates receive full public financing, may not accept any contributions, and must abide by expenditure limitations set by the state.65 Candidates may spend only the
revenues they receive from the state.
The Act's full funding removes major obstacles to running an effective campaign. Under private financing systems (and partial public
financing systems), only those who can quickly accumulate large
amounts of money can mount a competent campaign. ' Private financing often limits the pool of candidates to only the wealthy and
those with access to wealth.6 7 Unlike some previous campaign finance
efforts, the Act's full funding provision opens the door to all qualified
candidates, not merely to those who can quickly accumulate large
sums of money.68
The Act's full funding also reduces corruption. 9 The Supreme
Court has noted that contributions may lead to corruption or the appearance of corruption.7" Indeed, contributions may lead to a "quid
pro quo" situation where a legislator will reward a contributor by voting for the contributor's positions.7 The likelihood of this quid pro
quo situation increases when a legislator relies on "special interest"
money to run his campaign.72 Therefore, full public funding significantly reduces the possibility of corruption by eliminating the need for
contributions.73 Additionally, the Act's full funding gives candidates a
choice among campaign financing options74 which increases their ability to express their message. Candidates will likely choose the option-private or public funding-which gives them more money and a
larger voice to communicate their ideas to the electorate.
Candidates.
64

63. Id. § 1125(5).
64. See id § 1125(7)-(9).
65. ld. § 1125(6). The revenues allocated to candidates equal the average of the
previous two elections. Id. § 1125(8)(A)-(C). For contested primaries, the allocation

equals the average amount of expenditures made by each candidate during the previous two contested primary elections. Id. § 1125(8)(A). For uncontested primaries, the
allocation equals the average amount of expenditures made by each candidate during

the previous two uncontested primary elections (or the contested amount, if lower).
Id § 1125(8)(B). For general election, the allocation equals the average amount of
expenditures made by each candidate during the previous two elections (or nothing if
uncontested). Id. § 1125(8)(C)-(D).
66. Jezer and Miller, supra note 2, at 470-71.
67. Id.; see Clean Money Campaign Reform, supra note 3.

68. See Jezer & Miller, supra note 2, at 489.
69. See Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 487 F. Supp. 280,
285 (S.D.N.Y.) (three-judge court) (noting that a similar public financing act reduces
corruption), affd, 445 U.S. 955 (1980).
70. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976).
71. Id.
72. See Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 42, at 275-76.
73. See Republican Nat'l ComM, 487 F. Supp. at 285.

74. See, e.g., id. (holding that an increased choice in financing options increases
candidates' speech).
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Lastly, the Act's conditional spending ceiling helps equalize the
playing field among candidates.7" Because states cannot constitutionally place limits on campaign expenditures, well-financed candidates
can grossly outspend their opponents. The Supreme Court, however,
has held that candidates may voluntarily agree to limit their expenditures in exchange for public financing of their campaign. Thus, by
offering public financing in exchange for conformity to the spending
ceilings, Maine can achieve greater equality among the participating
candidates by putting them on a level financial playing field.76
2. Trigger Provisions
If candidates choose not to participate, Maine cannot satisfy its underlying policy goals. To reduce the likelihood of this possibility, the
Act includes a provision which induces candidate participation by mitigating some drawbacks of participation. This provision is commonly
known as a "trigger" provision.
a. Candidate-TriggeredMatching Funds
If a privately financed candidate spends above a participating candidate's expenditure ceiling, the state will issue more public money to
the participating candidate in an amount equivalent to the excess.7 7
In effect, the non-participating candidate's spending "triggers" a release of more money to the participating candidate in an amount
above the statutory ceiling.78 The state, however, will not continually
match all spending over the expenditure ceiling. 79 Rather, the state
will match each dollar spent over the limit until the spending reaches
an absolute ceiling of up to two times of the initial allocation to the
candidate.8"
This type of trigger provisions encourages participation with the
Act's spending limits.8 Without the triggered matching funds, candidates would fear being grossly outspent by their privately financed
opponent82 and might forgo public financing,83 leaving the state unable to satisfy its policy goals. The trigger provision addresses this
75. Weine, supra note 43, at 224 (noting that public financing "triggers" create a
level financial playing field).
76. Jezer & Miller, supra note 2, at 489 (noting that full public financing should
"create a level playing field").
77. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 21-A, § 1125(9) (West Supp. 1997).
78. Cf. Wilkinson v. Jones, 876 F. Supp. 916, 926 (W.D. Ky. 1995) (discussing a
"trigger provision" where non-participating candidate spending releases publiclyfunded candidates from a voluntarily accepted expenditure limitation).
79. Title 21-A, § 1125(9).
80. Id.
81. Jennifer A. Moore, Note, Campaign Finance Reform in Kentucky: The Race
for Governor, 85 Ky. L.J. 723, 751 (1997).
82. Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544, 1554 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 1820 (1997).

83. Id.
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problem by ensuring that participating candidates can keep pace with
big spending opponents, at least until the spending reaches the absolute ceiling.
b. Independent Expenditure Triggered Matching Funds
Non-candidates also spend money in campaigns.' In addition to
direct contributions, non-candidates spend money without giving it directly to a candidate and without coordination with that candidate.'
For example, non-candidates may spend money on television commercials or newspaper advertisements in support or opposition to one's
candidacy. This type of non-candidate spending is termed "independent expenditures." 6
The Maine Act's trigger provision requires the state to consider "independent expenditures" in determining when, if, and how much
matching funds should be allocated to participating candidates.6 7 The
state must aggregate all funds the non-participating candidate spends
with any independent expenditure spent to support that non-participating candidate. 8 When the aggregated spending exceeds the participating candidate's spending ceiling, the state allocates corresponding
matching funds.8 9
Most campaign finance laws contain no provisions limiting independent expenditures because the Supreme Court held that such
limitations violate the First Amendment.' States may restrict only
direct contributions to the candidate. 91 Therefore, many contributors
use independent expenditures as a loophole to avoid campaign spend84. See Erica H. McMahon, Note, Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission: A Flood of Party Dollars To Wash Away
Campaign Finance Laws, 6 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 365, 365-66 (1998).
85. See id.
86. Weine, supra note 43, at 227 (noting that the Republican National Committee
spent $800,000 "independently" attacking the Democratic nominee for a House seat
in New York and that in 1996, the AFL-CIO spent close to S2 million attacking a
Republican House incumbent in Arizona).
87. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 21-A, § 1125(9) (West Supp. 1997).
88. Id.
89. Id
90. See infra Part II.A.1.
91. Any "coordinated" expenditures by non-candidates are essentially contributions and are subject to restrictions. Federal Election Comm'n v.National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 492 (1985); Buckley v. Valeo. 424 U.S. 1,
46-47 (1976); see also Michael D. Leffel, A More Sensible Approach to Regulating
Independent Expenditures: Defending the Constitutionalityof the FEC's New Erpress
Advocacy Standard,95 Mich. L. Rev. 686, 686-90 (1996) (noting that reformers face a
large hurdle because independent expenditures warrant First Amendment protection). Independent expenditures which "expressly" advocate the support or defeat of
a candidate may be subject to reporting requirements to the Federal Election Commission. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44. Independent expenditures which merely advocate
an issue are not subject to reporting and disclosure requirements. Id. at 81-82; Leffel,
supra, at 689-90.
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ing limitations.92 Instead of abiding by contribution limitations,
wealthy contributors spend enormous sums by way of independent expenditures to support candidates without any restriction. 3 In recent
years, non-candidates have capitalized on this loophole by increasing
their independent expenditures. 94 The prevalence of independent expenditures, in turn, discourages candidates from participating in the
other reform acts that include voluntary expenditure limits because
participating candidates fear that their non-participating opponents
will grossly outspend them. 95
By considering non-candidate spending, the independent expenditure provision of the Maine Act prevents participants from being outspent by non-candidate money. Indeed, the participating candidate
receives public funds matching dollar-for-dollar any amount spent
above the ceiling by the candidate or his supporters in the form of
independent expenditures, up to two times the initial disbursement of
funds. 96 Thus, the provision provides candidates security and an incentive to participate.97
3.

Contribution Limitations

The Act prohibits anyone from contributing more than $500 in any
election to a gubernatorial candidate. 98 "Any election" refers to
either a primary or a general election. 99 Thus, the Act limits contributions to $500 for the primary election and $500 for the general election.'0 0 Thus, a contributor may give a total of $1000 to a single
candidate in an election cycle. The Act provides an even lower contribution limit for non-statewide races. 10 1 In these races, no one may
contribute more than $250 in any election to a candidate for state senator or state representative.1 0 2 Therefore, a contributor may give a
total of $500: $250 in the primary and $250 in the general election.
92. See Owen M. Fiss, Essay, Money and Politics, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 2470, 2471
(1997).
93. See Weine, supra note 43, at 227.
94. See id. (observing that independent expenditures have increased since Buckley); McMahon, supra note 84, at 366 (noting that independent expenditures play a
much greater role in influencing elections today than when the Supreme Court upheld
Buckley).

95. See Weine, supra note 43, at 226-27.
96. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 21-A, § 1125(9) (West Supp. 1997).
97. See Weine, supra note 43, at 227 (noting that triggers function as "insurance
policies" so that candidates may respond to independent expenditures).
98. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 21-A, § 1015(1).
99. Cf Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633, 641-42 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
2579 (1996). "Per election cycle," as opposed to "per election," refers to both the
primary and the general election. Id.
100. Cf id. (describing the difference between per election contributions and per
election cycle contributions); Russell v. Burris, 978 F. Supp. 1211, 1222 (E.D. Ark.
1997) (same).
101. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 21-A, § 1015(1).
102. Id.
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Like public financing, lower contribution limits are also aimed at
eradicating corruption. 10 3 Because candidates are less likely to grant
special favors to individuals who give small contributions, " the Act
requires that candidates rely on multiple small contributions rather
than a few large contributions. This way no single contributor can
extract a special favor based on the size of his contribution. Consequently, the problems caused by quid pro quo transactions will be less
likely to occur with lower contributions.
In sum, the people of Maine hope that the combination of these
provisions will change the face of campaign financing. While previous
reform efforts in other states supplied only partial funding or other
minor incentives in exchange for expenditure limitations,105 the Maine
Act provides more comprehensive and far-reaching reforms.1 06 Because it provides full funding and strong assurances that participating
candidates can remain competitive despite spending limits, 0 7 the Act
should achieve high participation rates and successfully diminish
problems associated wvith campaign financing. If proven successful,
this Act should lay the foundation necessary to change the structure of
campaign financing. The Act, however, must survive First Amendment challenges. The folloving part examines the pertinent First
Amendment case law.
II.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT: CAMPAIGN SPENDING AND
PUBLIC FINANCING

In its 1976 decision in Buckley v. Valet, the Supreme Court recog-

nized that campaign spending implicates First Amendment rights.'"
Indeed, the Buckley Court held that campaign spending is a "fundamental First Amendment activit[y]" because it is a form of political
communication. 10 9

In Buckley, the Court examined amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA"), a stringent campaign finance reform
measure which Congress passed in response to the Watergate scandal."1 In particular, the Court scrutinized provisions that restricted
103. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1976).
104. The Supreme Court held that contribution ceilings, however, are sufficient to
deal with the reality of quid pro quo arrangements. ld.: W\illiam J. Connolly. Note,
How Low Can You Go? State Campaign Contribution Limits and the First Amend-

ment, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 483, 517 (1996).
105. See Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 10A.25 (10)(a) (\Vest 1997) (releasing participating
candidates from an expenditure ceiling when a non-participant spends above a certain
threshold); Robert Schlesinger, Lawmakers Turn to the States as Battleground for
Campaign Reform, The Hill, Nov. 5, 1997, at 6.
106. Moos, supra note 36; Clean Money Campaign Reform, supra note 3.
107. See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 21-A, §§ 1121-1128 (West Supp. 1997).
108. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 3.
109. Id. at 14.
110. See Moore, supra note 81, at 727-28.
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candidates' and contributors' ability to spend money in political
elections."'
In its decision, the Court split campaign spending into two components: "contributions" and "expenditures." ' 12 "Contributions" consist
of donations to candidates, 113 while money spent by candidates in furtherance of their campaign constitutes "expenditures." '" 14 Although
both forms of spending implicate First Amendment rights, the Court
found that expenditures warrant greater protection than contributions.' 1 5 Indeed, the Court upheld a mandatory $1000 contribution
limit as constitutionally valid," 6 but struck down mandatory expendi17
ture limitations, finding that they violated the First Amendment.'
The Court held, however, that candidates may "voluntarily" agree to
abide by such limitations in exchange for some benefit, specifically
public financing."'
Today, a majority of the Court still upholds the Buckley expenditure/contribution framework." 9 While this framework remains generally intact, Buckley did not clearly define the acceptable parameters of
either expenditure limits or contribution limits. As a result, subsequent lower court decisions more clearly defined
permissible and im120
permissible restrictions on campaign spending.
This part examines the standards set by Buckley and its progeny.
This part first discusses Buckley's analysis of expenditure limitations
and public financing conditioned upon expenditure limitations. Next,
this part scrutinizes post-Buckley case law regarding these issues.
Lastly, this part examines the case law delineating constitutionally
permissible contribution limitations.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 6-7.
Id. at 19-21.
See id. at 21.
See id. at 19-20.
"[AlIthough [FECA]'s contribution and expenditure limitations both implicate

fundamental First Amendment interests, its expenditure ceilings impose significantly
more severe restrictions on protected freedoms of political expression and association
than do its limitations on financial contributions." Id. at 23.
116. Id. at 58-59.
117. Id. at 53-54.
118. Id. at 57 n.65, 85-109.
119. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n,
116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996). Some justices, however, favor eliminating Buckley's framework by removing the expenditure/contribution distinction. Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg favor constitutional restrictions on expenditures as well as
contributions. See id. at 2332 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas, on the other
hand, believes there should be no limitations whatsoever on contributions or expenditures. See id. at 2325-28 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in

part).
120. See, e.g., Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that a
"trigger" provision did not implicate First Amendment rights), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
1820; Russell v. Burris, 978 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Ark. 1997) (considering the factual
context surrounding the election campaign in determining whether a contribution
limit is narrowly tailored).
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A. The Constitutionalityof Public Financingand
Expenditure Limitations
Because Buckley provided a framework for all campaign finance reform measures, this section first discusses Buckley's analysis of expenditure limits and public financing. This section then discusses
subsequent lower court decisions which further defined the constitutional parameters regarding public financing and expenditure limits.
Much of these decisions examined whether the public financing statutes unconstitutionally "coerce" candidates to participate and accept
expenditure limitations or permissibly encourage candidates to participate. This section then focuses on the constitutionality of specific
provisions wvithin public financing statutes. After examining the specific provisions, this section looks at Day v. Holahan, the one case
that deviates from the rest of the case law in this area. Instead of
analyzing whether statutes unconstitutionally coerce candidates to accept expenditure limitations, this case examines whether public financing statutes cause "self-censorship" among those involved in
campaigns.
1. Buckley v.Valeo

Expenditure limitations violate First Amendment free speech rights
because they pose substantial restraints on the quantity of political
speech. 122 Because effective political communication in modem society requires the expenditure of money, the Court equated a candidate's spending of money in political campaigns to a candidate's
political speech." Consequently, any expenditure limitation imposed
on a candidate violates the First Amendment because it "reduces the
quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed,
the depth
of their exploration, and the size of the audience
1 24
'
reached.'

In addition to restrictions on candidate spending, the Court also
held that restrictions on "independent expenditure[s]" by non-candidates violate the First Amendment." Indeed, because the First
Amendment ensures non-candidates a right to "speak [their] mind[s]"
and engage in "vigorous advocacy,"126 any restriction of their expenditures "heavily burdens core First Amendment expression."2 7
121. 34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir. 1994).
122. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19.
123. Id The Court analogized that "[b]eing free to engage in unlimited political
expression subject to a ceiling on expenditures is like being free to drive an automobile as far and as often as one desires on a single tank of gasoline." Id. at 19 n.18.
124. Id. at 19.
125. Id. at 47-48.
126. Id. at 48 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964))
(citations omitted).
127. Id
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Nonetheless, campaign spending restrictions may be upheld if: 1)
the restrictions address a compelling state interest; and 2) the restrictions are narrowly tailored to meet that state interest. 128 The Court
found, however,
that limiting expenditures addressed no compelling
129
interest.
Buckley, however, did not eliminate the possibility of expenditure
limitations in elections. The Court held that candidates may "voluntarily" abide by expenditure limitations in exchange for public financing
of their elections. 3 ° Indeed, in Buckley, a FECA provision which implemented this type of public financing for presidential elections
passed constitutional muster.' 3 1 The Court reasoned that as long as
candidates may "voluntarily" choose to participate, 32 nothing prevents candidates from privately funding and freely spending. Moreover, the Court reasoned that public financing promotes more speech
by presenting candidates with additional financing options. 133 In this
system, candidates select the option that gives them a larger voice.
2. Republican National Committee v. Federal Election Commission:
Public Financing/Expenditure Limitations Reaffirmed
Four years after Buckley, in Republican National Committee v. Federal Election Commission,'3 4 a three-judge district court examined an-

other challenge to the FECA public financing provision. The
plaintiffs claimed that the statute violated candidates' rights because
"practical matter[s]" forced them to accept public financing and to
restrict their spending,
in violation of their First Amendment right to
135
communicate.
Like the Buckley Court, the Southern District of New York rejected
this contention' 36 and reasoned that public financing was merely an
128. Id. at 25-29.
129. Id. at 53-54. Justice Stevens argued that the state does have a sufficient compelling interest to limit expenditures by political parties. Colorado Republican Fed.
Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 116 S. Ct. 2309, 2332 (1996) (Stevens,
J., dissenting). These interests include both limiting corruption or the appearance of
corruption and providing a level electoral playing field by limiting the cost of federal
campaigns. Id.
130. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 57 n.65.
131. Id. at 143. The Court also noted that a candidate may accept public financing
conditioned upon an agreement to completely forgo private fund-raising. Id. at 57
n.65. FECA permitted presidential candidates of major parties to accept private contributions for primaries, but not for general elections. Id. at 88-90.
132. Id. at 57 n.65.
133. The FECA public financing provision "is a congressional effort, not to abridge,
restrict, or censor speech, but rather to use public money to facilitate and enlarge
public discussion and participation in the electoral process, goals vital to a self-governing people. Thus, [this provision] furthers, not abridges, pertinent First Amendment values." Id. at 92-93 (footnotes omitted).
134. 487 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y.) (three-judge court), affd, 445 U.S. 955 (1980).
135. Id. at 283.
136. Id.
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"additional funding alternative. '137 Candidates could choose between
financing alternatives and select the option they believed would provide more money 138 and "enhance [their] powers of communication
and association."'139 Thus, the court concluded that the public financing statute increased a candidate's ability to speak, rather than restricting it.
The plaintiffs also argued that the statute compelled candidate participation in violation of the First Amendment because privately financed candidates could not raise as much money as the public
financing statute provided to the program's participants.1 40 The court
dismissed the plaintiffs' argument by reasoning that because participating grants more money "its effect would be to facilitate and enlarge
their exercise of free speech over what it would otherwise be rather
than to inhibit or reduce their speaking power.' 4 1 Accordingly,1 the
42
court held that the statute burdened no First Amendment rights.
Even assuming the statute burdened First Amendment rights, the
court held that Congress narrowly tailored the statute to meet a compelling state interest. 14 3 The court identified: 1) the reduction of the
"deleterious influence of large contributions" on the political process;
2) the facilitation of candidate communication with the electorate; and
3) freedom of candidates from the rigors of fund-raising as "significant" state interests behind the public financing program.' Although
its analysis was limited, the court explained that the expenditure limitations were narrowly tailored because they 'further[ ] an important
or substantial governmental interest'; that interest is 'unrelated to the
suppression of free expression'; and 'the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms
is no greater than is essential to the
4 5
furtherance of that interest.'"
In short, Republican National Committee reapplied the rationale of
Buckley and upheld expenditure restrictions conditioned upon public
financing." The Supreme Court affirmed this decision without an
opinion. 147
137. Id. at 285.
138. Id. Candidates have a "legitimate choice whether to accept public funding and
forego private contributions." Id. at 286.
139. Id. at 285 (emphasis omitted).
140. Id
141. Id
142. Id.
143. Id. at 285-86.
144. Id. at 285 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91 (1976)).
145. Id. at 286-87 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
Indeed, without the spending limit, the court reasoned candidates would have to engage in the hardships of fund-raising by soliciting "deleterious contributions" to keep
pace with their opponents. See id. at 285-86.
146. Id. at 283-87.
147. Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 445 U.S. 955 (1980).
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Subsequent Developments

After Buckley and Republican National Committee, public financing
programs appeared to qualify as the only constitutionally permissible
restriction of campaign expenditures. As a result, some reformminded legislatures passed voluntary public financing statutes that
conditioned public funds upon acceptance of expenditure ceilings. 145
Many of these statutes included "incentive" provisions designed to induce candidate participation in the public financing/expenditure limitation schemes.' 4 9 This section first examines the case law regarding
the constitutionality of incentive provisions. It then discusses the
courts' analyses of two specific incentive provisions: 1) "trigger" provisions; and 2) "cap gap" provisions.
a. Incentive Provisions: Inducement or Unconstitutional Coercion

Opponents of recent public financing statutes alleged that incentive
provisions "chill" their speech.'
In particular, they claimed that
these provisions "coerce" candidates to participate and accept expen-

diture limitations in violation of the First Amendment.' 5' Despite
these legal challenges, courts generally upheld these incentive provisions.' 52 While courts recognized that a public financing statute 1could
54
unconstitutionally "coerce,"' 53 they rarely found such coercion.
To find coercion, courts examine whether a statute's provisions
present candidates with a truly voluntary choice between private and

public funding.' 55 When candidates have a legitimate choice between
funding alternatives, no coercion occurs and the statute violates no

148. See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 121A.020-121A.030 (Michie 1993 & Supp.
1996 (providing partial public financing conditioned upon acceptance of expenditure
limitations); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 17-25-19 to 17-25-20 (1996) (same).
149. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. § 10A.25(10)(a)(1) (West 1997) (releasing candidates from voluntary expenditure limits when an opponent spends as little as 20 percent of the participant's expenditure limit); R.I. Gen. Laws § 17-25-30 (1996)
(granting benefits to participating candidates in the form of free television time and a
contribution limit above the limits for non-participants).
150. See Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544, 1546 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 1820 (1997); Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26, 38 (1st Cir. 1993);
Weine, supra note 43, at 229; see also Wilkinson v. Jones, 876 F. Supp. 916, 928 (W.D.
Ky. 1995) (rejecting the contention that the incentive provision "chills the speech of
privately financed candidates").
151. See, e.g., Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1546 (dismissing appellant's claim that the
statute "coerce[d]" participation).
152. See, e.g., id. at 1549-55 (upholding the constitutionality of incentive
provisions).
153. See, e.g., Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 38 ("Coerced compliance with fundraising caps
and other eligibility requirements would raise serious, perhaps fatal, objections to a
system like Rhode Island's [public financing scheme].").
154. See Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1551; Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 38-39.
155. See, e.g, Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 38 (holding that "voluntariness" is an important
factor in examining campaign financing schemes).
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First Amendment rights.1 56 Coercive statutes, on the other hand, leave
candidates with no real choice but to use public funding. '57 Thus, if a
provision prevents a candidate from choosing private funding, the
provision effectively "coerces" a candidate in violation of the First
Amendment. 158
Under this analysis, courts have held that incentive provisions do
not amount to unconstitutional coercion where they merely encourage
or induce candidates to restrict their spending.' 59 Indeed, nothing in
the First Amendment prevents states from encouraging candidates to
choose public funding and spending limits because such inducements
do not penalize, censure, or proscribe speech." 6° So long as the statutory scheme achieves a "rough proportionality" between the benefits
provided to candidates-such as incentive provisions-and restrictions imposed on candidates-spending
caps-such inducements to
16 1
participate do not coerce.
Statutes unconstitutionally coerce, however, when incentive provisions upset this "rough proportionality" by "creat[ing] ...a large dis-

parity between the benefits provided to publicly financed candidates
and ...

restrictions imposed on those candidates."'1 2 For instance,

coercion may occur where incentive provisions provide publiclyfunded candidates with unusually rich benefits and few restrictions. 6 3
Ultimately, the courts have found that only "large disparities" between these benefits and restrictions constitute coercion.'6
Provisions which fall short of this "large disparity" between benefits
and restrictions are necessarily constitutional."-' Incentive provisions
may even favor publicly financed candidates without upsetting this
156. "To sum up, the implication of the public funding cases is that the government
may legitimately provide candidates with a choice among different packages of benefits and regulatory requirements." Id at 39; see also Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1550 (finding that participation in this program was truly voluntary, and thus the plaintiffcandidate's claim of coerced participation had no merit).
157. See Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 38 (noting that coerced compliance destroys the
voluntariness of campaign financing statutes).
158. Id.
159. See, e.g., Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1549-50 (holding that an incentive provision
was merely an inducement to encourage maximum candidate participation in public
financing).
160. See id at 1549-50; Adam S. Tanenbaum, Comment, Day v. Holahan: Crossroads in Campaign Finance Jurisprudence,84 Geo. LJ. 151, 157-59 (1995).
161. See, e.g., Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1550-51 (holding that a public financing statute
achieved a relative balance between benefits and restrictions and therefore, did not
coerce participation); Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 38-39 (same).
162. Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1549; see also Vote Choice, 4 F-1d at 38 ("There is a
point at which regulatory incentives stray beyond the pale, creating disparities so
profound that they become impermissibly coercive.").
163. "Stated otherwise, the Appellants contend that these provisions make the pubic financing option so attractive that they effectively compel candidates to enroll in
the State's financing plan." Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1549.
164. Id. at 1549-50.
165. See Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 38-39.
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"rough proportionality,"1 66 as states may legitimately encourage participation. 167 Indeed, the courts have found that requiring states to
make private financing equally attractive defeats the purpose of public
financing schemes: 16 8 without inducements, no candidates would participate, and states could not satisfy their compelling and substantial
interests. 169 In short, the courts concluded that this permissible favoritism does not make the public financing program so coercive as to
prevent candidates from voluntarily choosing private funding.
b.

Specific Incentive Provisions: "Triggers" and "Cap Gaps"

Opponents have mounted First Amendment challenges to some
specific incentive provisions.1 70 The courts have engaged in a coercion
analysis when examining these provisions. This section examines the
courts' First Amendment analyses of two such provisions-"trigger"
provisions and "cap gap" provisions.
The most common type of trigger provision permits participating
candidates to spend above the expenditure ceiling if non-participating
candidates spend over some threshold amount.1 7 ' Another type of
trigger provision releases participants from their spending ceiling if a
non-participant's supporters spend above the spending ceiling. 7 ' A
third type of trigger provision aggregates the spending of a non-participating candidate and his supporters in determining when the participant is released from the spending ceiling. In effect, under each type
of trigger, opposition spending-by either the opposing candidate or
his supporters-triggers the participants' ability to spend above the
statutory ceiling. Some "triggers" provide additional public funding
166. See Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1554-55. Indeed, the "state need not be completely
neutral on the matter of public financing of elections." Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 39.
"[N]ot every burden on the exercise of a constitutional right, and not every pressure
or encouragement to waive such a right, is invalid." Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 487 F. Supp. 280, 285 (S.D.N.Y.) (three-judge court) (quoting
Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 218 (1978)), affid, 445 U.S. 955 (1980).
167. States may induce candidate participation to forward the state interests that
the public financing statutes address. Wilkinson v. Jones, 876 F. Supp. 916, 928 (W.D.
Ky. 1995). Moreover, "inducements ... do not per se render the State's scheme
coercive because they are not inherently penal." Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1550.
168. See Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1554; Republican Nat'l Comm., 487 F. Supp. at 285.
169. Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1555.
170. Id. at 1549 (challenging Minnesota's expenditure limitation waiver and the
contribution refund provision).
171. See id. at 1547 (noting that non-participant spending triggers a waiver of an
expenditure ceiling); see also Weine, supra note 43, at 227-28 (discussing different
forms of trigger provisions). See generally Fred Wertheimer & Susan Weiss Manes,
Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to Restoring the Health of Our Democracy, 94
Colum. L. Rev. 1126, 1150-51 (1994) (endorsing "trigger provisions" as necessary to
ensure that public funding remains a "viable option").
172. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 21-A, § 1125(9) (West Supp. 1997); Weine, supra note
43, at 227-28.
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to participants,'73 while others simply release the participant from any
spending ceiling.' 74

The Eighth Circuit examined the constitutionality of trigger provi-

sions in Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez."5 In Rosenstiel, plaintiffs challenged

a Minnesota public financing statute that contained a trigger provi-

sion. 7 6 This trigger removed the spending ceiling and provided par-

ticipants additional public funds when a non-participant spent an
amount as low as twenty percent of the participant's ceiling. 1"
The plaintiffs alleged that this statute's trigger "coerced" participation because the benefits provided by the statute, namely the triggered
waiver of the expenditure ceiling, made participation so attractive that
the statute compelled their enrollment. 17 This compelled participation, plaintiffs concluded,179violated candidates' First Amendment right
to spend without limits.

The Eighth Circuit disagreed. 80 The court held that the statute did
not create such a profound disparity between benefits and restrictions
that candidates were coerced to accept expenditure limitations."' The
173. Title 21-A, § 1125(9); Weine, supra note 43, at 227-28.
174. See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 10A.25(10)(a)(1)-(2) (West 1997). The Minnesota public financing statute provides:
A candidate who has agreed to be bound by the expenditure limits imposed
by this section as a condition of receiving a public subsidy for the candidate's
campaign is released from the expenditure liniis ...

if the candidate has an

opponent who does not agree to be bound by the limits and receives contributions or makes or becomes obligated to make expenditures during that
election cycle in [specified amounts].
Id. (emphasis added). Some triggers provide both additional funds and a release from
the expenditure ceiling. See Weine, supra note 43, at 227-28. Weine notes three trigger responses to two political scenarios:
In general, there are two scenarios for which triggers may be designed and
three types of responses that can be provided for these two scenarios. The
two scenarios are: (1) spending by a [non-participating] candidate ...and
(2) independent spending [by a non-participant's supporters]. The three
general types of responses that triggers may provide are: (1) allowing opt-in
candidates to spend additional funds and to raise these funds privately, (2)
alloing opt-in candidates to spend additional funds and to raise these funds
privately with the help of government matching funds for each contribution
raised; and (3) providing candidates with government funds outright.
Id.
175. 101 F.3d 1544 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1820 (1997).
176. The court called the trigger an "expenditure limitation waiver." IL at 1547.
The statute included other challenged inducements, including a provision which gave
tax deductions to those who contributed to participating candidates. Id. at 1546. The
court also held that this provision did not violate the First Amendment. See id.at
1550-51.
177. Id at 1547.
178. Id. at 1549.
179. Id.
180. Id at 1550.
181. Id.
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provision was merely another incentive.'1 2 In its analysis, the court
noted that the trigger simply encourages candidate participation by
eliminating a powerful disincentive-a privately-funded
opponent
1 83
vastly outspending a participating candidate.
Moreover, the court observed that because there was nothing "inherently penal" about this provision" and "participation [was] truly
voluntary,"1 85 nothing prevented non-participants from raising and
spending as much as possible. 8 6 Indeed, non-participants could still
18 7
express themselves, and even outspend participating candidates.
The trigger merely compensated for some of the drawbacks of participation.' 8 8 The court concluded that because candidates may voluntarily choose the most advantageous financing option, "the State's
scheme promotes, rather than detracts from, cherished First Amendment values." '1 9
Another provision that faced First Amendment challenges is a "cap
gap."' 190 A "cap gap" is a provision which allows participating candidates to accept larger contributions than non-participating candidates.' 9' The First Circuit examined cap gaps in Vote Choice, Inc. v.
DiStefano.' 92 In Vote Choice, the plaintiffs challenged a Rhode Island
public financing statute which contained a cap gap provision.1 93 The
Rhode Island cap gap allowed participating candidates to raise up to
$2000 per contributor while non-participating candidates could only
raise up to a $1000 limit per contributor.' 94 These plaintiffs alleged
that the statute coerced participation because its combination of pen182. Id. at 1550-51. Indeed, the "trigger" eliminated a strong fear among candidates of being grossly outspent by a privately-financed opponent. Id. at 1551. Without
this "trigger," the court reasoned, candidates might forgo participation. See id.
183. Id. at 1551.
184. Id. at 1550.
185. Id.
186. See id. at 1549-50.
187. Id. at 1551 n.6 (observing that non-participants may strategically use the trigger provision to outspend participants). The Court also noted that because a nonparticipating candidate controlled the triggering event, he or she controls when and if his
or her participating opponent will be freed from the ceiling. Id. at 1551. Hence, the
non-participating candidate can use the provision to his or her strategic advantage.
See id.
188. See id. at 1550-51.
189. Id. at 1552 (citations omitted). Another post-Buckley decision, Wilkinson v.
Jones. 876 F. Supp. 916 (W.D. Ky. 1995), also ruled that triggers do not unconstitutionally coerce candidate participation. See id. at 928. This court echoed much of
Rosenstiel's rationale, and concluded that triggers promote more speech, not less. Id.
at 928. Indeed, more speech results where a participating candidate is given an opportunity to respond to his or her adversary's lucrative spending. See id. at 928.
190. See, e.g., Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26, 37-40 (1st Cir. 1993) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge to a "cap gap").
191. See id. at 30.
192. Id. at 37-40.
193. Id. (citing R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 17-25-10.1, 17-25-30(3) (1988 & Supp.1992)).
194. See id. at 30.
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alties on non-participants' 95 and enticing incentives given to partici1 96
pants destroyed the voluntariness of the public financing statute.
The First Circuit rejected these arguments with an analysis similar
to that in Rosenstiel.197 The court pointed out that because "there is
nothing inherently penal about a $1000 contribution cap[J,] Ilogic sug-

gests that the higher cap is... [not] a penalty imposed on [non-participants]."' 98 Instead, the $2000 limit is merely a benefit conferred upon
the participant. 99
The court reasoned that while the cap gap may be an attractive incentive, such an incentive does not eliminate a candidate's true voluntary choice and, therefore, does not run afoul of the non-participant's
First Amendment rights.20 0 The state merely tried to persuade candidates to participate, not to punish non-participants. 2 0' The court reasoned that such persuasion is not coercion because, with the cap gap,
the state achieved a "rough proportionality" between the statute's advantages-public financing and the cap gap-and restrictions-expenditure limits.2 0 2 In the end, the state provided candidates with "an
authentic choice"2 ' 3 where they could voluntarily choose whether
public or private funding best suited their needs.2'" Consequently, the
court concluded that the cap gap provision neither penalizes candidates nor
coerces them into surrendering their First Amendment
20 5
rights.
4. Narrowly Tailored to a Compelling State Interest
Even if a public financing statute burdens First Amendment rights,

the statute may still be valid206 if it: 1) furthers a compelling govern195. See id. at 38.
196. Id.
197. See id. at 38-39. The First Circuit decided Vote Choice before the Eighth Circuit decided Rosenstiel; the decisions are very similar. Compare Rosenstiel v. Rodiguez, 101 F.3d 1544, 1555 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that Minnesota's trigger provision
did not violate First Amendment rights), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct 1820 (1997), with Vote
Choice, 4 F.3d at 26, 39 (holding that Rhode Island's cap gap provision did not violate
First Amendment rights). In fact, the Rosenstiel court frequently cited Vote Choice in
its decision. See Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1550-51.
198. Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 38. Indeed, Buckley found $1000 contribution limits to
be constitutionally valid. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23-35 (1976).
199. See Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 38.
200. Id. at 38-39.
201. See id at 39.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 40 n.17.
204. See id. at 39-40.
205. Id.; see also Wilkinson v. Jones, 876 F. Supp. 916. 928 (W.D. Ky. 1995) (finding
a "cap gap" constitutionally permissible).
206. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC v. Maupin, 71 F.3d 1422. 1426 (8th Cir. 1995);
Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 487 F. Supp. 280, 285
(S.D.N.Y.) (three-judge court), affd, 445 U.S. 955 (1980).
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mental interest; and 2) is narrowly drawn to serve that interest.20 7
Although most post-Buckley courts found that these statutes burdened no First Amendment rights,2 08 they engaged in this type of
20 9
scrutiny arguendo.
Post-Buckley courts identified three "compelling" state interests
that public financing statutes address. First, public financing statutes
reduce the possibility of corruption that may arise from large campaign contributions.2 10 Second, public financing statutes free candidates from the pressure of raising campaign contributions. 211 Lastly,
these statutes facilitate communication with the electorate.21 2
The post-Buckley courts found that most legislatures narrowly drew
incentive provisions to serve these interests. 1 3 While not thoroughly
analyzing whether the restrictions were narrowly tailored, the courts
noted that a "state need not be completely neutral on the matter of
public financing of elections" because narrowly tailored public financing statutes must necessarily bestow benefits upon participating candidates.21 4 Without the benefits that favor participants, the courts found
that candidates have "no incentive to participate, and the State's goals
207. Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544, 1553 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 1820 (1997); Shrink, 71 F.3d at 1426; see Republican Nat'l Comm., 487 F. Supp.
at 285.
208. Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1553-54; Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 39; see Wilkinson, 876 F.
Supp. at 928.
209. Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1553-54; Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 39; Wilkinson, 876 F.
Supp. at 928. Some courts hold that "strict scrutiny" applies in campaign financing
cases while others rule that a less exacting scrutiny applies. Compare Service Employees Int'l Union v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 955 F.2d 1312, 1322 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding that an intermediate level of scrutiny applies in campaign financing cases),
with Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633, 637-38 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2579
(1996) (holding that strict scrutiny applies in campaign financing cases). Nonetheless,
both examine whether the statute is drawn to meet a compelling or significant state
interest. Carver, 72 F.3d at 637-38; Service Employees Int'l Union, 955 F.2d at 1322.
210. Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1553; Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 39. Buckley also recognized the fight against corruption as a compelling state interest. See Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976).
211. See Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1553; Republican Nat'l Comm., 487 F. Supp. at 285.
Rosenstiel calls this a related concern to corruption and a "well settled" compelling
interest. Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1553.
212. Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1553; Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 39; Republican Nat'l
Comm., 487 F. Supp. at 285.
213. See Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1553-54. The court reasoned that without the trigger incentive, few, if any, candidates would participate for fear of being outspent by
their privately-funded opponents. Id. at 1554. Therefore, the statute is narrowly
drawn because absent the "trigger," the statute cannot effectively address the state's
compelling interests. Id. Similarly, the Vote Choice court held that the cap gap was
narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest because without the cap gap, candidates may forego participation with the public financing statute. Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at
39-40; see also Wilkinson, 876 F. Supp. at 928 (reasoning that a trigger provision prevents publicly-funded candidates from being outspent by privately-financed candidates). Thus, the provision is narrowly tailored because it "avoid[s] a circumstance in
which the publicly-financed candidates may be unfairly disadvantaged." Id.
214. Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 39-40.
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of decreasing the chances of corruption and freeing up more of the
candidates' time for campaigning would be frustrated. 2''- 5
5. Day v. Holahan: Chilling Speech Through "Self-Censorship"
Not all incentive provisions survived First Amendment scrutiny.
Two years before Rosenstiel, the Eighth Circuit considered another
trigger provision in Day v. Holahan.2 16 In Day, the plaintiff challenged

an amendment to Minnesota's public financing provision, 217 that provided that any "independent expenditures" by non-candidates would
trigger benefits to participating candidates. 218 The Day court struck
down the trigger as violating the First Amendment rights of those
wishing to make expenditures.219 The court's reasoning, however, deviated from all other public financing cases. 2 Unlike Rosenstiel and
Vote Choice, the Day court did not engage in a "coercion" analysis.
Instead, it ruled that the provision burdened the First Amendment
because it created "self-censorship" among those who make "independent expenditures." 1 It explained that the independent
spender's knowledge that his spending wrill increase a public subsidy
to an opposing candidate "chills the free exercise of ...

protected

speech." 2'
Day further held that the provision failed to adequately address a
compelling state interest.' Although the state professed that its compelling interest was to enhance public confidence in the political process by encouraging more candidate participation, Day rejected this
reasoning.' The court refused to hold that this provision was narrowly tailored to the professed interest because the state already
achieved nearly 100 percent participation in the public financing
program. 225
Day's precedential value seems limited. While not explicitly overruling Day, the Eighth Circuit limited it to its narrow set of facts
where participation was nearly 100 percent.,3 Indeed, in Rosenstiel,
215.
216.
217.
218.

Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1555.
34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1359-60.
Id. The amendment provided that non-candidate independent expenditures

spent in support of a participating candidates' opponent triggered an increase in participants' spending ceiling in an amount equal to the independent expenditures. Id. at
1359.
219. Id. at 1362.

220. See Weine, supra note 43, at 233.
221. Day, 34 F.3d at 1360.

222. Id
223. Id. at 1361.

224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544, 1555 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 1820 (1997).
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the Eighth Circuit refused to apply Day, noting that the confined factual circumstances "make Day inapposite. ' 2 7
As demonstrated above, much of the case law reveals that public
financing statutes that are conditioned upon acceptance of expenditure limitations are constitutional. Part II.B explores the constitutionality of contribution limits.
B.

Contribution Limitations

Campaign contribution limits are constitutionally permissible. At
some point, however, contribution limitations become unconstitutionally low. This section first explores Buckley's First Amendment analysis of contribution limits. This section then explores post-Buckley
cases that attempt to answer the following question: How low of a
contribution limit is too low?
1. Buckley v. Valeo
Like expenditures, contribution limits impact the First Amendment
and any limitation must survive First Amendment scrutiny.122 Unlike
in the expenditures context, the Court recognized that involuntary
limits on contributions could be constitutional. 2 9
Contribution limits implicate the First Amendment rights of both
candidates and contributors: 230 contribution limits impact associational and expressive rights of contributors 231 and communication
rights of candidates.232 Despite the foray into a protected area, the
Supreme Court has upheld contribution restrictions. 33 While limiting
the associational quality of a contributor's donation is the "primary
First Amendment problem" of contribution restriction,234 the Buckley
Court found that contributors have other equally effective associational
avenues2 35 that "mitigate[ ] the impact of contribution lim' 23 6
its."
Similarly, the Court found that restrictions on contributions
only marginally inhibit contributors' political expression because contributions are merely a general expression of support for candidates
227. Id.
228. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23-25 (1976).
229. See id. at 23-35
230. See id. at 1, 15, 20-23.
231. See id. at 15, 21-22. "A limit on contributions... need not be analyzed exclusively in terms of the right of association or the right of expression. The two rights
overlap and blend; to limit the right of association places an impermissible restraint
on the right of expression." Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454
U.S. 290, 300 (1981).
232. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.
233. Id. at 23-30.
234. Id. at 24.
235. Id. at 22. One such avenue would be volunteering their service to a candidate.
Id.
236. Connolly, supra note 104, at 490.
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and their views. Actual transformation of contributions into political
3
debate involves someone other than the contributor.2

Contribution limits threaten candidates' rights even less than contributors' rights. The Court pointed out that such limits only minimally restrict a candidates' free speech communications, as they do

not severely disrupt the potential for "robust and effective discussion"
of candidates' campaign issues. 23 8

Contribution restrictions are constitutional if a compelling state interest is served, and the limitations imposed are narrowly tailored to
serve that interest. 239 The Court recognized the reduction of corruption or the appearance of corruption associated with large campaign

contributions as a compelling state interest. 240 The Court deemed this
interest compelling because large contributions undermine representative government when "given to secure a political quid pro quo from
current and potential office holders.1 24 1 In Buckley, the Court found
that Congress narrowly tailored a FECA provision that banned contributions over $1000 to presidential candidates.2 4 2 Indeed, the Court
pointed out that the $1000 limit focused on the "quid pro quo" associated with "large" contributions and did not significantly interfere with
protected First Amendment rights.2 4 3
Even though Congress could have implemented a less restrictive
limitation, the Court still upheld FECA's contribution limits as narrowly tailored. 2' Indeed, the Court implemented a kind/degree analysis that substantially defers to legislative determinations regarding
237. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.
238. Id. at 28-29.
239. See id. at 25-29.
240. Id. at 26-28. The Buckley Court did not hold that this was the only compelling
state interest. The Court merely stated that it need not "look beyond [this] purpose.Id. at 26. In a subsequent case, Austin v. Miciigan Chamber of Comm., 494 U.S. 652,
659-60 (1990), the Court recognized a compelling state interest in limiting the impact
of a large aggregation of wealth by a corporation. The Court held that
[r]egardless of whether [the] danger of "financial quid pro quo" corruption
may be sufficient to justify a restriction on independent expenditures, Michigan's regulation aims at a different type of corruption in the political arena:
the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that
are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or
no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas.
Id. (citations omitted).
Other sufficient interests may exist. Justices Stevens and Ginsburg assert that an
"interest in leveling the electoral playing field by constraining the cost of. . . campaigns" would be sufficient. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 116 S. Ct. 2309, 2332 (1996) (Stevens J.. dissenting). For a
thoughtful argument addressing the maintenance of integrity in the political process,
see Frank J. Sorauf, Politics, Experience, and the First Amendment. The Case of
American Campaign Finance, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1348, 1349-50 (1994).
241. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26.
242. Id. at 28-29.
243. Id. at 27-29.
244. See id. at 30.
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limits. 24 5 Under this analysis, courts may conclude that a limit is unconstitutionally low only if it is a difference "in kind" from the Buckley limit.246 Differences "in degree" are presumptively narrowly
tailored.2 47
A difference becomes a "difference in kind" when the limit is excessively different from the Buckley approved limit. 24 8 Only then may a
court strike down legislatively drawn contribution limits. 249 The Court
forbid any judicial interference with differences "in degree," however.
As to "in degree" differences, a court may "not invalidate the legislation ... [i]f it is satisfied that some limit on contributions is necessary." Moreover, once a limit is established that differs "in degree," "a
court has no scalpel to probe, whether, say, a $2,000 ceiling might not
serve as well as $1,000." 0 The legislatively drawn limit which differs

"in degree" is, therefore, necessarily narrowly tailored.
2. Post-Buckley Developments-How Low is Too Low?
Because Buckley drew no bright line regarding a minimum contribution
limit, lower courts were left to determine: how low is too
25 1

While all courts held that the $1000 limit in Buckley was not a
constitutional minimum," 2 different courts have applied differing
low?

245. Id. at 30; California Prolife Council Political Action Comm. v. Scully, No.
CIV.S-96-1965LKKDAD, 1998 WL 7173, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 1998) (quoting
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30); Connolly, supra note 104, at 518.
246. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30.
247. Id.; California Prolife Council PoliticalAction Comm., 1998 WL 7173, at *7
(citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30).
248. The Buckley Court compared two cases to illustrate when a discrepancy
"amount[s] to differences in kind." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30. In one case, Rosario v.
Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973), the Court upheld a voting requirement that prevented individuals from voting in a party primary where individuals had not registered with their party of choice at least thirty days before the previous general
election. In a subsequent case, Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973), however, the
Court struck down another voting requirement that prevented individuals from voting
in a primary election if they had voted in the primary of another party in the previous
twenty-three months. As the Eighth Circuit later observed, the Kusper requirement
was a "difference in kind" from Rosario; hence, the Supreme Court could strike it
down. Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633, 641 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 2579
(1996) (examining Kusper and Rosario); see also Connolly, supra note 104, at 518
(noting that an "in kind" difference refers to a "nature or character as determining
likeness or difference between things" while differences "in degree" refer only to "a
stage in the scale of intensity or amount" (quoting Random House Dictionary of the
English Language 525, 1056 (2d ed. 1987)). In Buckley, the Court could not engage in
an in kind/degree analysis because it had no baseline against which it could compare
the $1000 limit.
249. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30.
250. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30 (quoting from Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 842 (8th
Cir. 1975)).
251. See Connolly, supra note 104, at 497-500.
252. See, e.g., Carver, 72 F.3d at 641 ("recognizing that the $1,000 limit in Buckley
was not a 'constitutional minimum'); Arkansas Right to Life State Political Action
Comm. v. Butler, 983 F. Supp. 1209, 1222 (W.D. Ark. 1997) (noting that a $1000 limit
is not a constitutional minimum).
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analyses to determine whether a limit was narrowly tailored.2 3 Nonetheless, some consistent guidelines have emerged.
a.

Carver v. Nixon

Only two appellate circuits examined whether a contribution limit
was too low to be narrowly tailored.' First, the Eighth Circuit conducted an analysis of limits lower than Buckle), in Carver v. Nion. In
this case, Thomas Carver, a former state legislator, sued to enjoin the
enforcement of a new Missouri measure that limited contributions to
$100-$300 per election cycle. 55 The Eighth Circuit held that this limit
was not closely drawn to a compelling state interest. --6 Integral to its
decision was a kind/degree analysis. 7 First, the court acknowledged
that unless the contribution limitation was a difference "in kind," it
could not "fine tune" the limit. 5 8 In this case, however, mostly quantitative considerations justified the court's belief that the limit
amounted to a difference in kind. 5 9
First, the court pointed out that the statute limited contributions on
a "per election cycle" basis, not on a "per election" basis.2 ' Significantly, the court noted that a "per election cycle" limit constituted a
much smaller number than a "per election" limit. 26 1 For instance,
under a $300 "per election cycle" limit, a contributor may donate only
$300, but under a $300 "per election" limit, a contributor may donate
262
$300 for the primary election and $300 for the general election.
253. Compare National Black Police Ass'n v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections
and Ethics, 924 F. Supp. 270, 275, 281-82 (D.D.C. 1996) (determining whether contribution limits severely impact First Amendment Rights and, if so, whether the limits
are tailored to a sufficient governmental interest), iith Carver, 72 F.3d at 641 (determining whether the limit is narrowly tailored by examining whether the contribution
limit differs "in degree" or "in kind" from the Buckley limit (citation omitted)).
254. See Kentucky Right to Life, Inc. v. Terry, 108 F.3d 637, 648 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 162 (1997); Carver, 72 F.3d at 640-45.
255. See Connolly, supra note 104, at 500.
256. Carver, 72 F.3d at 641-42. In doing so, the court struck down a district court
decision which held that the state has a compelling interest in restricting "all" contributions. The court asserted that states have a compelling interest only in reducing
"large" contributions. Id. at 638-39.
257. Id. at 641-44.
258. Id. at 641. The court reiterated Buckley's familiar command that courts have
no "'scalpel to probe' whether a different ceiling might not serve as well." Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 30 (1976)).
259. Id. at 644 ("We hold that the [contribution] limits amount to a difference in
kind from the limits in Buckley."); Connolly, supra note 104, at 530-31.
260. Carver,72 F.3d at 643. Indeed, an "election cycle" (sometimes called an "election year") includes both the primary and general election. See Russell v. Burris, 978
F. Supp. 1211, 1218 (E.D. Ark. 1997). Quite differently, "per election" includes only
one election, either the primary or general election. See id.
261. Carver, 72 F.3d at 641-42.
262. See id.
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In Carver, the $100-$300 limits applied "per election cycle. ' 263 Conversely, the Buckley $1000 limit was "per election." 2" Thus, the court
held that the $100-$300 per election cycle limits were dramatically
lower than the $1000 per election approved in Buckley.265 The Missouri limits actually allow only $50-$150 in contributions "per elec266
tion" when compared with the $1000 Buckley "per election" limit.
After examining other quantitative factors,26 7 the court examined

one non-quantitative, non-money consideration in its "kind/degree"
analysis. The court pointed out that because so many Missourians
contribute in the $50-$100 range, the challenged Missouri limits affect
a much higher percentage of potential contributors than were affected
by the Buckley-approved FECA limits. 2 68 Carver observed that the
limits in Buckley affected only about five percent of contributors.269
Quite differently, the limits examined in Carver affected about twenty
to thirty-five percent of all contributors. 70
The court concluded that this great difference in quantity and its
effects on a large percentage of contributors amounted to a difference
"in kind. ' 271 As a result, it brandished its scalpel and held that Missouri did not narrowly draw the contribution limits.272 Thus, it refused
to "adopt the lowest contribution limits in the nation and restrict the
First Amendment rights of so many. "273
b. Kentucky Right to Life v. Terry
The Sixth Circuit also examined a contribution limit lower than
Buckley. In Kentucky Right to Life, Inc. v. Terry,274 the Sixth Circuit
upheld a Kentucky statute that, in the court's reading, limited contributions to $1000 "in any one election year" 275-in other words, per
election cycle.
263. Id. at 641.
264. Carver adjusts Buckley's $1000 per election limit to $2000 per election cycle

limit. Id.
265. Id.
266. Similarly, viewed on a "per election cycle" basis, the Missouri limit of $100$300 per election cycle is "dramatically lower" than Buckley's $2000 "per election
cycle" limit. See id. at 641-42.
267. For instance, the court considered inflationary factors. See id. at 641.
268. Id. at 643-44.
269. Id. at 643.
270. Id. at 643-44.
271. Id. at 644.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 644.
274. 108 F.3d 637 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Kentucky Right to Life, Inc. v.
Stengel, 118 S. Ct. 162 (1997).
275. Id. at 648. Note, however, that Judge Suhrheinrich mistakenly read the statute. The statute states $1000 in one "election," not "election year." Ky. Rev. Stat.
Ann. §§ 121.150(6), 121A.050(1) (Michie Supp. 1996).
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Even though this limit amounts to $500 when compared with the
Buckley per election limit, 276 the court noted that it was not "different
in kind from the $1000 limitation on direct contributions.., upheld in
Buckley."'2 7 Hence, the court refused to "take out a scalpel to probe
dollar limitations. '278 Although its examination was limited, the court
alluded to "context" as a consideration in determining whether a contribution limit differs in kind and is narrowly tailored.2 79 As discussed
below, many district court decisions place substantial weight on the
context of the election.
c.

District Courts: Context

While the district courts' reasoning varies, most emphasize that considering quantity alone is insufficient to determine whether legislatures narrowly tailored contribution limits.3 ° Indeed, most evaluate

the factual context surrounding elections. 2s1 "[E]very campaign con-

tribution limitation must be judged on its own circumstances," noted
one court 2 Another observed that any decision regarding the constitutionality of contribution limits is "fact-dependent, drawn from all of
the record evidence."' To illuminate how factual context may be dispositive, this court explained that a $100 limit may be invalid in one
jurisdiction but perfectly valid in another depending on the factual

276. One thousand dollars per election year (or per election cycle) allows only one

contribution of $1000. In Buckley, however, contributors may donate S1000 for the
primary and again for the general election. See Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1, 23-24
(1976) (noting the $1000 limit in any election). Hence, $1000 per election year is half
of Buckley's limits or $500 per election.
277. Kentucky Right to Life, 108 F.3d at 648.
278. Id.
279. See id&(noting the "context" of federal elections in Buckley).
280. See, e.g., California Prolife Council Political Action Comm. v. Scully, No.
CIV.S.96-1965LKKDAD, 1998 WL 7173, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 1998) (noting that
courts must consider the factual circumstances surrounding an election); Arkansas
Right to Life State Political Action Comm. v. Butler, 983 F. Supp. 1209, 1225 (V.D.
Ark. 1997) (holding that courts must look at more than the quantity of the limit in
comparison to Buckley's limit);.
281. See, eg., National Black Police Ass'n v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections
and Ethics, 924 F. Supp. 270, 281 (D.D.C. 1996) (holding that a determination of a
minimum contribution limit is "fact-dependent, drawn from [context]"), vacated as
moot, 108 F.3d 346, 347 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing passage of legislation increasing contribution limits).
282. California Prolife Cowcil PoliticalAction Conn.. 1998 WL 7173, at *10.
283. National Black Police Ass'n, 924 F. Supp. at 281. Note that this court completely ignored Carver's call for a "kind/degree" analysis. Instead, it first examined
whether the limit "severely limit[ed]" political dialogue. Id. Whether a contribution
restriction severely limited the political dialogue was "fact-dependent." Id. If the
restriction severely limited political dialogue, it looked to see if the state narrowly
drew the limit to a sufficiently important interest. Id.
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context.2 84 Relevant facts include "the size of the district, the
285 cost of
media, printing, staff support, [and] news media coverage.
One case, in particular, illustrates the impact of context on the constitutionality of contribution limits. In Russell v. Burris,a court within
the Eighth Circuit examined Arkansas' $100 per election limit for
non-statewide elections.2 "6 Significantly, the court upheld this limit
even though Carverrejected similar limits as unconstitutionally low. 87
The court opined that "[a]pplied in this case, the factors on which the
Carver court relied do not alone provide a clear answer as to the
degree-versus-kind question. 2 88 The answer rests in the factual
context.2 8 9

Although the court reiterated much of Carver's reasoning,290~its emphasis on context explains the different outcomes.29 ' Specifically, the
court looked at the cost of running a campaign and the size of the
electoral districts.2 92 Under this expanded analysis, the court ruled
that a $100 limit for non-statewide elections was merely a difference
"in degree," in large part due to the low cost of elections. 293 Thus, the
court refused to use its "scalpel" and held that the $100 contribution
limit was narrowly drawn.2 9 4

In short, in determining the constitutionality of limits lower than
Buckley, courts must engage in a kind/degree analysis that depends
heavily on the factual context. The next part examines Maine's limits
under this analysis. Before this, the following part first analyzes the
constitutionality of public financing provisions.
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

In March 1997, an assortment of candidates, contributors, and political action committees ("PACs") challenged the constitutionality of
284. See id.
285. California Prolife Council PoliticalAction Comm., 1998 WL 7173, at * 10.; see
also Russell v. Burris, 978 F. Supp. 1211, 1223-24 (E.D. Ark. 1997) (considering the
cost of running a campaign and the size of the electoral districts); National Black
Police Ass'n, 924 F. Supp. at 278 (considering the cost of television and radio
advertising).
286. Russell, 978 F. Supp. at 1222-23. The court also examined a $100-$300 limit for
statewide races. Id.
287. Compare Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633, 642-43 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 2579 (1996), with Russell, 978 F. Supp. at 1222-23; see also Arkansas Right to
Life State Political Action Comm. v. Butler, 983 F. Supp. 1209, 1225 (W.D. Ark. 1997)
(concluding that a limit lower than Carver's limits may be constitutional depending on
the factual context).
288. Russell, 978 F. Supp. at 1223.
289. See id. at 1223-24.
290. Indeed, the court heeded the "degree-versus-kind" test. Id. at 1222-23.
291. "This interpretation is, of necessity, fact-specific." Id. at 1221.
292. Id. at 1223-24.
293. Id. at 1223 (noting that under the limits, candidates can still mount effective
campaigns).
294. Id. at 1222-23.
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the Maine Act in the Federal District Court of Maine.29 5 These opponents of the Act, including such unlikely allies as the National Right to
Life PAC and the American Civil Liberties Union,2 96 claimed that the
Act "chills" speech in violation of the First Amendment. 29 In particular, they challenged the Act's public financing provisions2 98 and contribution limits. 2 99 This part analyzes both challenges and conclude

that the Act does not violate the First Amendment.
A.

Constitutional Challenges to Expenditure Restrictions and
Public Financing

The Act's opponents challenged the provisions delineating the pub-

lic financing/expenditure limits as violating their First Amendment

rights.3 °0 They contended that these provisions penalize speech and
coerce candidates into participating and accepting expenditure limitations.3 0 ' Specifically, they targeted the trigger provision, which grants
matching funds to participants.30 2
First, opponents claimed that the Act's trigger penalizes or "chills"
their speech by effectively imposing a spending ceiling on non-participants. 3 Because the state matches every dollar spent over the ceiling,
opponents reasoned that non-participants will not spend above the
ceiling for fear of "subsidizing" their adversaries. 3" Similarly, because
the trigger also considers independent expenditures in support of candidates, opponents argued that the trigger forces independent spenders to cap their spending to avoid aiding participants' speech."' In
295. Candidates and contributors challenged the Act. Daggett v. Devine, 973 F.
Supp. 203 (D. Me. 1997). The National Right to Life Political Action Committee
State Fund challenged the Act. Id. at 203 (D. Me. 1997). The Court consolidated
both cases. Id.
Because the Act is not effective until 2000, however, the court dismissed the claims
due to lack of ripeness and standing. Daggett, 973 F. Supp. at 205-06. The court ruled
that the claims should be ripe after the 1998 elections. Id. at 205.
296. James Ridgeway, Money Talks: When Contributions Equal Free Speech, It's
Hard To Reform Campaign Finance, Village Voice (New York), Mar. 4, 1997, at 30.
297. Plaintiffs Am. Compl. at 8, National Right To Life Political Action Comm. v.
Devine, 973 F. Supp. 203 (D. Me. 1997) (No. 96-359-P-H).
298. Id at 15-17; Plaintiffs Am. Compl. at 26-29, Daggett, 973 F. Supp. at 203 (D.
Me. 1997) (No. 97-56-B-H).
299. Plaintiff's Am. Compl. at 9-10, NationalRight to Life Political Action Comm.
(No. 96-359-P-H); Plaintiffs Am. Compl. at 25. Daggett (No. 97-56-B-H).
300. Plaintiffs Am. Compl. at 15-17, National Right to Life PoliticalAction Comm.
(No. 97-56-P-H); Plaintiff's Am. Compl. at 26-29, Daggett (No. 97-56-B-H).
301. Plaintiffs Am. Compl. at 15-17, National Right to Life PoliticalAction Comm.
(No. 96-359-P-H); Plaintiff's Am. Compl. at 26-29, Daggett (No. 97-56-B-H).
302. Plaintiff's Am. Compl. at 16-17, National Right to Life PoliticalAction Comm.
(No. 96-359-P-H); Plaintiffs Am. Compl. at 20-24, Daggett (No. 97-56-B-H).
303. Plaintiff's Am. Compl. at 16-17, National Right to Life PoliticalAction Comm.
(No. 96-359-P-H).
304. Plaintiff's Am. Compl. at 20-21, Daggett (No. 97-56-B-H).
305. Plaintiff's Am. Compl. at 16-17, National Right to Life PoliticalAction Comm.
(No. 96-359-P-H).
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other words, the trigger created the unconstitutional "self-censorship"
found in Day v. Holahan. 6
Next, opponents claimed that as a "practical matter," the trigger
coerces participation. 30 7 Because non-participants feel they must
spend below the cap,3 °8 opponents reasoned that candidates would be
foolish to turn down free public funding.30 9 As a result, candidates
"feel[] compelled to participate in the public financing mechanism. ' 310 Thus, opponents concluded that the Act "indirectly... impose[s] spending limits on candidates" in violation of the First
Amendment. 31'
Opponents further claimed that the trigger's inclusion of independent expenditures in calculating matching funds gave participants a
spending advantage. 312 They explained that when independent spending plus candidate spending exceeds the ceiling, any dollar spent by a
non-participant will trigger more money to participants. 3 13 Under this
scenario, even if the non-participant does not spend money above the
ceiling, the spending of his or her supporters results in additional
funding to participants, leaving participants with a spending advantage. 314 Thus, opponents contended that this spending differential penalizes candidates and created another "disparity"
which further
315
coerces a candidate into accepting public financing.
In sum, opponents concluded that the combined effect of the Act's
"inducements" and "penalties" gave participants a "substantial advantage" over non-participants. 316 Hence, the "practical effects" of the
Act diminished the voluntariness of a candidate's choice by coercing
317
participation in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Despite opponents' arguments, the Act does not restrict First
Amendment rights. 318 As discussed below, any claim of "chilling
speech" and "coercion" is inconsistent with recent precedent and First
Amendment principles. Indeed, the trigger implicates no First
306. Id.; see supra Part II.A.5.

307. Plaintiffs Am. Compl. at 23, Daggett (No. 97-56-B-H).
308. See id. at 23-24.
309. "To spurn public financing and to attempt to outspend [participating candidates] ...is, in most cases, both unrealistic and exceeding [sic] unlikely." Id.
310. Id. at 24.
311. Id. at 5.

312. Id. at 21.
313. Id. at 21-22.
314. Id. at 21-23. For example, a participant can outspend a non-participant under a
specific hypothetical. First, assume a $5000 spending cap. Next assume that a nonparticipant's supporters independently spend $3000 in support of his candidacy. Next,
assume the non-participant spends $3000 in his campaign. His spending of $3000 will
trigger an extra $1000 over the participants' spending cap. Thus, the participant can
spend $6000, while the non-participant has only spent $3000.
315. Id. at 24.
316. Id.
317. See id.

318. Weine, supra note 43, at 232-36.
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Amendment rights because it remains voluntary, does not coerce participation or penalize speech, and even promotes more speech. Consequently, the Act deserves to be upheld just as the public financing
systems were upheld in Buckley and its progeny.-""
1. Participation with the Act is Voluntary, Not Coercive
Participation with the Act's "alternative campaign financing option" and its expenditure cap remains voluntary. The Act merely provides candidates with a choice between campaign financing options.32 0
Nothing in the Act prevents candidates from privately funding their
campaigns or from spending limitless amounts. Indeed, opponents
point to nothing in the Act that stops non-participants from soliciting
funds, spending their own money, or spending well above the Act's
absolute ceiling. In short, "each candidate... [remains free to] spend
321
any amount of funds raised by private funding, without any ceiling."The Act's trigger provision is merely a legitimate inducement by the
state, not a penalty that unconstitutionally coerces or chills speech."
With the exception of the Day court, every court that has examined
triggers has held that they do not violate the First Amendment because they do not penalize, inhibit, or censure non-participating candidates' speech.3" Indeed, as Rosenstiel explains, triggers "do not per se
render the State's scheme coercive because they are not inherently
penal."32' 4 Instead, triggers operate as an incentive to participate.
Public financing statutes that include such incentives do not violate
the First Amendment when the statute achieves a proportionality "between advantages afforded to, and restrictions placed on, publicly financed candidates." 3"
Statutory programs maintain this
proportionality by balancing the restrictions placed on candidates with
incentive provisions that benefit candidates.312 The Act's trigger helps
maintain this constitutionally permitted proportionality between advantages and restrictions.
319. See id. at 236.
320. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 21-A, § 1123 (West Supp. 1997).
321. Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n. 487 F. Supp. 280, 28384 (S.D.N.Y.) (three-judge court) (noting that no First Amendment violation took
place because FECA is voluntary), aft'd, 445 U.S. 955 (1980).
322. See Weine, supra note 43, at 232-33; e.g., Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez. 101 F.3d
1544, 1549-50 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. C1. 1820 (1997) (holding that Minnesota's triggered expenditure limitation waiver does not violate the First Amendment).
323. Weine, supra note 43, at 233.
324. Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1550; see also Wilkinson v. Jones, 876 F. Supp. 916, 928
(W.D. Ky. 1995) ("This court is not convinced that [the trigger] impermissibly chills
the speech of privately-financed candidates simply because it enables the speakers'
adversaries to respond.").
325. Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1550; see Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano. 4 F.3d 26, 3839 (1st Cir. 1993).
326. Courts note that achieving this proportionality is fundamental to public financing schemes and is necessary to encourage participation. Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 154950, 1555; Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 38-39.
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The Act imposes significant restrictions on candidates when they
participate in the Act: 1) candidates relinquish their First Amendment right to spend without limits; 327 2) candidates surrender their
right to receive contributions; 32 and 3) candidates subject themselves
to civil and criminal penalties for violating the terms of voluntary participation. 329 Absent any benefits, the net effect of these restrictions,
particularly the spending cap, would burden candidates
so much that
331
"foolhardy.
as
participation
view
would
some
To achieve a proportional balance, Maine compensates these burdensome restrictions with the trigger's benefits. 33' As Rosenstiel explains, a state's trigger achieves this "balancing act" 3 32 by "avert[ing] a
powerful disincentive for participation in its public financing scheme:
namely, a concern of being grossly outspent by a privately financed
opponent with no expenditure limit. ' 333 As spending by independent
supporters and candidates has grown in recent years,3 34 the Act's trig-

ger confronts this powerful disincentive and encourages all to participate by reducing the possibility of a participating candidate being
outspent by non-participants and independent spenders.335
Even if Maine's trigger does not achieve a perfect balance between
the benefits and the restrictions, the "proportionality," nevertheless,
remains intact. 336 As public financing statutes need not achieve "perfect equipoise," a balance in favor of benefits is permissible; 337 in fact,
only profound disparities between benefits and restrictions may
amount to unconstitutional coercion.338 Indeed, because "'state[s]
need not be completely neutral on the matter of public financing'...
any favoritism enjoyed by the publicly funded candidate.., is simply
a permissible byproduct of the campaign financing process. ' 339 For example, such permissible "favoritism" in recent public financing stat327. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 21-A, § 1125(6) (West Supp. 1997).
328. Id.
329. Id. § 1127.
330. Weine, supra note 43, at 226.
331. Cf Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1549-50 (finding that a Minnesota trigger provides a
relative balance in terms of benefits provided to participating candidates and the restrictions imposed on those candidates); Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 38-39 (finding that a
"cap gap" achieves a relative balance between advantages afforded to and restrictions
placed on participating candidates).
332. See Weine, supra note 43, at 232.
333. Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1551.
334. Weine, supra note 43, at 226.
335. See Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1549-50; Weine, supra note 43, at 226-27.
336. Cf Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1551 (noting that the examined public financing
scheme achieves a "rough proportionality necessary to entice, but not coerce," even if
it is not perfectly balanced); Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 39 (same).
337. See Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1551; Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 39.
338. Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1549-50; Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 38.
339. Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1555 (quoting Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 39).
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utes includes fund raising advantages, 34' tax breaks,- and the ability
to outspend.3 4 2 For this reason, even if the Act's independent expendi-

ture trigger creates a possible spending advantage and tilts the scale of
benefits in favor of participants, as opponents contend, the provision
still does not coerce participation.- 3 The alleged spending advantage
is merely the permissible "favoritism" which participants may enjoy. 3' Consequently, the rough proportionality remains intact, and no
cognizable First Amendment claim arises, as the Act neither coerces
participation,
penalizes speech, nor inhibits a candidate's true
34
choice.

340. See Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 38-40 (upholding a "cap gap" even though it favors
participants).
341. See Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1554-55 (upholding a contribution tax deduction to
contributors who donated to participants' campaigns even though non-participating
candidates were not provided the same benefit).
342. See Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 487 F. Supp. 280,
289 (S.D.N.Y.) (three-judge court) (upholding a public financing statute even though
it may provide participants with more funding than privately funded candidates can
raise), affd, 445 U.S. 955 (1980).
343. See Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 39; Republican Nat' Conn.. 487 F. Supp. at 285-85.
344. See Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1555.
345. In fact, other constitutionally approved statutes gave participants a spending
advantage. For instance, the Rosenstiel-approved Minnesota statute allowed participants a spending advantage; when non-participants spend as low as 20% of the ceiling
(an amount they would surely reach), the state continues to subsidize participants and
allows them to spend without a limit. Id. at 1547 (citing Minn. Stat. Ann
§ 10A.25(10)). Clearly, participants in the Minnesota statute have a spending advantage as they are subsidized without a cap. Nevertheless, the court upheld the statute.
Id at 1557.
The Maine Act does not even grant as large a spending advantage as the Minnesota
act. While the Act provides dollar for dollar matching funds, the Act caps spending
with an absolute ceiling. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 21-A, § 1125(9) (West Supp. 1997).
In contrast, Minnesota permanently frees participants from any spending restrictions,
giving participants a permanent spending advantage. Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 10A.25(10)(a)(1)-(2) (West 1997).
Moreover, under the FECA plan affirmed by the Supreme Court, the Republican
National Committee court viewed spending advantages as inconsequential. See Republican Nat'l Comm., 487 F. Supp. at 285. Under the FECA framework, opponents
argued that FECA provided more public money than a non-participant could likely
raise. Nonetheless, the Republican National Committee court rejected an argument
that this public financing scheme was coercive because more money "facilitate[s] and
enlarge[s]" the exercise of free speech "rather than . . . inhibit[s] or reducejs]
speaking power[s]." Id.
Opponents may contend that the constitutionally approved FECA scheme is not a
valid comparison because it contains no trigger provision. On the contrary, the Maine
Act bears considerable resemblance to FECA. Both acts contain an absolute ceiling.
They differ merely in how the state determines the amount of the subsidy (or the
ceiling). FECA calculates its subsidy by past election, while the Act provides that
spending in current elections will trigger its ceiling. Whether the state sets the ceiling
at a level that could be easily reached or not reached at all, under FECA or the Act, is
of no relevance. As stated above, providing more money "facilitate[s] and enlarge[s]
[participants'] exercise of free speech ... rather than ... inhibit[s] or reducefs] their
speaking power." Id. Accordingly, the ability to outspend burdens no First Amendment rights as it merely induces participation and balances benefits with restrictions.
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2. Maine's Trigger Promotes More Speech, Not Less
Not only does Maine's trigger not "coerce" participation and "chill"
speech, it actually promotes First Amendment interests.34 6 Where

non-participants speak by spending, participants respond. By enabling participating candidates to respond to their high spending opponents, the Act fosters the vibrant exchange of ideas and adds to the
347
political debate by allowing the electorate to hear more viewpoints.
In other words, it promotes the core principles that underlie the First
Amendment.348
Additionally, the Act promotes speech by permitting candidates a
choice among "alternative campaign financing option[s].

3 49

With an

additional choice, candidates have an opportunity to select which option most enhances their "powers of communication and association."35 Accordingly, Maine's trigger does not burden the First
Amendment. Instead, it enhances First Amendment interests and injects a substantial dose of equity into election campaigns.351 Maine's
citizens demanded this result; a court should affirm this democratic
choice by following the weight of judicial precedents in this area of
First Amendment law.
3.

Day v. Holahan Wrongly Held That a Trigger Provision
"Chilled" Speech

Any reliance on Day to prove that the Maine trigger "chills" speech
ultimately fails.352 Not only is Day inconsistent with all other cases
that have examined public financing statutes, it also contradicts established First Amendment jurisprudence and ignores the purpose behind the First Amendment.353
Day's holding states that an individual's speech is chilled when the
individual knows that his or her spending will trigger money for an
346. See Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1551 (holding that a similar trigger provision promotes First Amendment interests); Wilkinson v. Jones, 876 F. Supp. 916, 928 (W.D.
Ky. 1995) (same); Day v. Hayes, 863 F. Supp. 940, 947 (D. Minn. 1994) (same).
347. See Rosenstiel,101 F.3d at 1552; Wilkinson, 876 F. Supp. at 928; see also Weine,
supra note 43, at 235 (noting that triggers promote First Amendment interests). "To
the extent the statute provides for increased debate about issues of public concern
raised by an independent expenditure, it promotes the free and open debate the First
Amendment seeks to foster and protect." Day, 863 F. Supp. at 947.
348. See Weine, supra note 43, at 235.
349. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 21-A, § 1123 (West Supp. 1997).
350. Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26, 39 (1st Cir. 1993). Moreover, the
dollar for dollar response even resembles some existing privately funded races. Indeed. in privately funded elections, candidates try to keep pace with their opponents'
spending. Because it resembles privately funded races, the matching fund provisions
can hardly be construed as a profound disparity that stifles a true choice.
351. See Weine, supra note 43, at 232-36.
352. Id. at 233.
353. Id. at 232-35.
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opponent's response. 354 This notion is antithetical to the First Amendment. The First Amendment is supposed to encourage a healthy exchange of ideas, 355 not inhibit individuals from responding to
speech.3 56
The First Amendment is concerned with persecution, not reprisal.
That is, it protects individuals from being persecuted-or chilledfrom speaking. Its purpose is not to inhibit individuals from re3ponding to speech. Otherwise, the First Amendment would be
used not to foster the type of vibrant exchange of ideas necessary
for democracy to flourish, but instead would serve to give one or
more speakers hegemony of the market of speech. 57
In short, promoting responsive speech never amounts to an unconstitutional "chill" of speech.
The "chilling" of speech occurs when the state penalizes, restricts,
censures, or proscribes an individual's speech.3 5 s Promoting speech

does not amount to an unconstitutional "chill, ' 359 because it does not
proscribe or censure one's speech. Even the government's vigorous
criticism of an individual's speech does not "chill" First Amendment
rights.360 Moreover, Buckley points out that the government should
provide financial assistance to enhance speech. 61 Therefore, because
the Act does not penalize or censure any speech, the Act's promotion
of candidates' responsive speech, in fact promotes, rather than unconstitutionally "chills" speech.
Day ignored these principles. 362 Under the statutory scheme overruled by Day, the plaintiffs were not silenced by the government's
trigger in any way.36 3 The trigger was merely an inducement to en354. Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1360 (8th Cir. 1994).
355. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 n.127 (1976) (citing New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). Indeed, statutes that proscribe speech violate the
First Amendment.
356. Weine, supra note 43, at 233.
357. Id.
358. See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 12-16 (1972) (holding that a cognizable
First Amendment violation requires finding a present objective injury or a threat of
direct injury to plaintiffs).
359. Weine, supra note 43, at 233.
360. See, eg., Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 480-82 (1987) (labeling speech "political propaganda" does not chill speech because it does not prohibit, edit, or censure
the speech); Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. Meese, 939 F.2d 1011, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(holding that government officials may vigorously criticize speech).
361. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 n.127. According to Buckley,

Legislation to enhance these First Amendment values is the rule, not the
exception. Our statute books are replete with laws providing financial assistance to the exercise of free speech, such as aid to public broadcasting and
other forms of educational media, and preferential postal rates and antitrust
exemptions for newspapers.

Id. (citations omitted).
362. Weine, supra note 43, at 233.
363. Id.
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courage participation.364 Plaintiffs were still "free to make as many
independent expenditures as they365desire[d] without restraint, censure,
or penalty by the Government.
An analogy elucidates these principles and demonstrates the frail
reasoning of Day and the tenuous position supported by opponents of
the Maine Act. Imagine that an organization forms to oppose a municipality's proposed school budget. This organization exercises its
free speech rights by distributing hundreds of pamphlets denouncing
the budget due to its new tax provisions. It vows to distribute the
pamphlets every day until voters reject the budget. In response, the
municipality announces that for every day the organization distributes
its pamphlets, it will distribute copies of an essay in support of the
proposal, so that the electorate may make an informed choice. This
essay explains that higher taxes are necessary to support a school
lunch program. According to Day's reasoning, the municipality's response "chills" the organization's speech in violation of the First
Amendment because the organization knows that its speech will trigger a response.36 6

Such a claim contradicts the very purpose of the First Amendment.36 7 While the First Amendment protects an "uninhibited, robust,
and wide open" expression of views necessary for a "healthy representative democracy, '3 68 Day's reasoning results in a less informed citizenry unable to hear

opposing viewpoints.36 9 Indeed, in the

hypothetical, Day's reasoning denies the municipality's citizens an opportunity to fully hear the city's proposal. Similarly, under the Act,
application of Day forbids Maine's citizens from fully hearing both
sides of a political debate.370 In the end, the practical effect of forbidding Maine's trigger leads to a monopolization of the speech market
by nonparticipating candidates and independent spenders.37t

364. See supra Part III.A.1.
365. Day v. Hayes, 863 F. Supp. 940, 947 (D. Minn. 1994).
366. See Weine, supra note 43, at 234 (describing Day's reasoning under a similar
analogy).
367. Id.
368. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 n. 127 (1976) (quoting New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
369. Weine, supra note 43, at 234.
370. Id. (noting that application of Day to triggers is contrary to First Amendment
principles).
371. See id. at 233 (noting that application of Day to triggers leads to a hegemony
of political speech).
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In light of Day's misguided reasoning, it comes as no surprise that

no court has followed

Day.372

All other courts have held that trigger

373
provisions survive constitutional scrutiny.

4.

The Act is Narrowly Tailored

Assuming arguendo that the Act's public financing provisions impact First Amendment rights, the Act would still survive constitutional
scrutiny because Maine narrowly drew the Act's provisions to further
its compelling interest. 374 Indeed, the provisions address the three

compelling interests identified by the public financing cases.37 5 First,

this program frees candidates from the pressures of fund-raising because they no longer need to raise funds. 376 Second, it facilitates communication with the electorate because candidates can now spend
more time communicating instead of soliciting donations.3 1 Third, it
eliminates reliance on corrupting contributions because candidates receive virtually no contributions. 78
Moreover, Maine narrowly drew the public financing provisions.
Although the public financing cases that have considered similar provisions provide only cursory analysis,37 9 they consistently found simi-

lar incentive provisions narrowly tailored to further the above

372. Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544, 1555 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 1820 (1997); Wilkinson v. Jones, 876 F. Supp. 916 (W.D. Ky. 1995); see supra
Part II; see also Weine, supra note 43, at 233 ("With the exception of the Eighth
Circuit decision in Day, each court reviewing a trigger concluded that the trigger did
not cause a cognizable First Amendment injury because the government was not actually inhibiting speech.").
373. See, e.g., Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1548-55; Wilkinson, 876 F. Supp. at 928; see
also supra Part II.
374. See Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1555 (holding a similar public financing statute was
narrowly tailored); Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26, 39.40 (1st Cir. 1993)
(same); Wilkinson, 876 F. Supp. at 928 (same); Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Federal
Election Comm'n, 487 F. Supp. 280, 285-87 (S.D.N.Y.) (three-judge court), aff'd, 445
U.S. 955 (1980) (same).
375. Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1553; Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 39 (citing Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 91 (1976); Wilkinson, 876 F. Supp. at 928, Republican Nat'l Comm., 487 F.
Supp. at 285 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 91).
376. Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1553; Vote Choice,4 F.3d at 39; Wilkinson, 876 F. Supp.
at 928; Republican Nat'l Comm., 487 F. Supp. at 285-86.
377. Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1553; Vote Choice,4 F.3d at 39; Wilkinson, 876 F. Supp.
at 928 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 91); Republican Nat'l Comm., 487 F. Supp. at 28586.
378. Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1553; Vote Choice,4 F.3d at 39; Wilkinson, 876 F. Supp.
at 928; Republican Nat'l Comm., 487 F. Supp. at 285-86.
379. These cases analyzed whether the challenged statutes were narrowly tailored
arguendo. Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1553; Wilkinson, 876 F. Supp. at 928.
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interests.3 80 Thus, the precedents of the public financing cases suggest

that the Act is also narrowly tailored.38 '
B.

Constitutional Challenge to the Maine Act's Contribution Limits

Opponents alleged that the Act's contribution limits violate their
First Amendment rights.3" They claimed that contribution limits inhibit candidates' speech and contributors' right to association much
more than the FECA limits in Buckley.3 83 While opponents recognized that Maine may limit large contributions due to its compelling

interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption,
they contended that the $250-$500 per election limits are too low to be

narrowly tailored."

4

380. See, e.g., Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1554 (holding that Minnesota's trigger was
narrowly tailored because it encourages participation); Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 40
("[W]e find Rhode Island's contribution cap gap narrowly tailored and logically related, in scope, size, and kind, to compelling governmental interests.").
Because these courts did not fully engage in an analysis of whether the provisions
were narrowly tailored, further explanation is helpful. Under Buckley's narrowly tailored analysis, courts defer to the state's determination of a campaign finance regulation if the regulation addresses the compelling interest and it does not differ in kind
from other campaign finance regulations. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 29-30. As stated
above, the trigger addresses Maine's compelling interests. Moreover, this limit does
not differ in kind from other constitutionally approved triggers because it does not
differ excessively from these other triggers. Indeed, the Act's trigger may be even less
restrictive than the trigger examined in Rosenstiel. While the Act triggers matching
funds only when the non-participant exceeds the participant's ceiling, the Rosenstiel
approved statute triggers the participant's release from the expenditure ceiling when
the non-participant spends as little as 20% of the expenditure ceiling. Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 10A.25(10)(a) (West 1997). Thus, as the Act's trigger provision merely differs
in degree, it is presumptively narrowly tailored.
Even if the trigger places participants in a better position than non-participants, the
Act is still narrowly tailored. Because a state "need not be completely neutral on the
matter of public financing of elections," the Act need not benefit both participants
and non-participants. Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1555 (quoting Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 39).
Such a contention "misses the point: If the benefits . . . were conferred upon all
candidates, participating and nonparticipating, there would be no incentive to participate, and the State's goals of decreasing the chances of corruption and freeing up
more of the candidates' time for campaigning would be frustrated." Id.
381. See id. at 1554. As Rosenstiel clearly held, Day is inapposite to a situation
where the state has not already secured nearly 100% participation in its public financing program. Id. at 1555.
382. Plaintiff's Am. Compl. at 25-30, Daggett v. Devine (D. Me. 1997) (No. 97-56B-H); Plaintiff's Am. Compl. at 9-10, National Right to Life Political Action Comm.
State Fund v. Devine (D. Me. 1997) (No. 96-359-P-H).
383. Plaintiff's Am. Compl. at 9, National Right to Life PoliticalAction Comm. (No.
96-359-P-H).
384. Plaintiffs Am. Compl. at 10, National Right to Life Political Action Comm.
(No. 96-359-P-H). Opponents also rely on Justice Thomas's concurrence in Colorado
Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission, 116 S. Ct.
2309, 2323 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment, dissenting in part). Justice
Thomas opined that contribution limits are per se not narrowly tailored because limiting contributions is not the least restrictive means of addressing the governmental
interest in reducing corruption. Id. at 2329. No other justice, however, has expounded
this viewpoint.
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Buckley and its progeny establish that a state may limit large contributions to further its compelling interests in reducing corruption or its
appearance.3 8 5 The sole question the courts must consider is whether
the contribution limits are narrowly tailored to further Maine's interests. A "kind/degree" analysis demonstrates that Maine narrowly
drew the limits on contributions. An examination of both quantitative
factors and the factual context indicate that Maine's limits differ only

"in degree" from Buckley's limits for presidential campaigns.
Focusing purely on quantity, the Act's contribution limits amount to

only a difference "in degree." Recognizing that FECA's $1000 is not a

constitutional minimum, 386 past decisions upheld limits comparable to
the Maine limits.3 87 Indeed, the Sixth Circuit, in Kentucky Right to
Life,3 m upheld a limit equal to the Maine gubernatorial limit, even
though it is equivalent to one half of the limit approved in Buckley.2' 9
In fact, no court has ever struck down a statewide limit lower than
Maine's gubernatorial limit. Moreover, an Arkansas limit much
smaller than Maine's local limit also passed constitutional muster despite being less than one quarter of the limit approved in Buckley. 390
Nonetheless, a "degree/kind" analysis requires more than merely
comparing numbers.3 9' Even if the challenged limit is merely a fraction of the Buckley limit, the context of the election may nonetheless
allow the contribution limit to pass scrutiny as a difference only in
degree.3" As Carver suggests, courts go beyond quantitative compari385. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23-35 (1976); Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633, 643
(8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 2579 (1996).
386. See, eg., Carver, 72 F.3d at 641 (recognizing "that the S1000 limit in Buckley
[is] not a 'constitutional minimum').
387. See Kentucky Right to Life, Inc. v. Terry, 108 F.3d 637, 648 (6th Cir. 1997);
Russell v. Burris, 978 F. Supp. 1211, 1223 (E.D. Ark 1997). In its "in kindlin degree"
analysis, Carvermandated that courts consider whether a limit is the larger -per election" or the smaller "per election cycle." Carver, 72 F.3d at 635, 641.44. Maine's limit
is the larger, "per election" limit.
388. 108 F.3d 637 (6th Cir. 1997).
389. The Act's gubernatorial limit is $500 per election or $1000 per election cycle
(or election year). Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 21-A, § 1015 (West Supp. 1997). The Sixth
Circuit upheld a $1000 limit in any election year in Kenrucki, Right to Life. 108 F.3d at
648.
Maine's local limit equals $250 per election or $500 per election cycle. Title 21-A,
§ 1015. Maine's gubernatorial limit equals $500 per election or S1000 per election
cycle. Id. Of course, this alone does not render a limit narrowly tailored or a difference "in degree." On a pure quantitative comparison-which standing alone, no
court supports-the local limit is one quarter of the Buckley approved limit and the
gubernatorial limit is one half of the Buckley limit.
390. Russell, 978 F. Supp. at 1223 (upholding a $100 limit for non-statewide
elections).
391. See California Prolife Council Political Action Comm. v. Scully, No. CIV.S-961965LKKDAD, 1998 WL 7173, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 1998) (holding that courts
must look at the factual context surrounding contribution limits, not merely "crude
comparisons").
392. See Arkansas Right to Life State Political Action Comm. v. Butler, 983 F.
Supp. 1209, 1222 (W.D. Ark. 1997) (noting that courts cannot determine that a limit is
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sons by examining the limit's impact on contributors.393 Carver notes
that if the contribution limits restrict more contributors from donating
than the limits in Buckley, this higher restriction may amount to a
difference "in kind. ' 39 4 While Buckley's limits affected about 5% of all
contributors, the limits in Carver affected about 20%. 395 This difference weighed into Carver's ruling that the limits were different "in
kind."' 396 Maine's limits, however, affect far fewer contributors than
the limits approved in Buckley. Indeed, when calculated to a "per
election cycle" limit, only 1.8% of all contributors to local races contributed above the limit imposed by the Act. 397 Similarly, only 4% of
all contributors to gubernatorial candidates donated above the Act's
new limits. 398 Thus, the Act's limit affects fewer contributors than the
FECA approved limits399in Buckley, suggesting that Maine's limit differs only "in degree.
Another fact-specific comparison reveals that the Act's limit differs
only "in degree" from the Buckley-approved presidential limit. The
"indegree" difference becomes apparent by comparing the low cost of
campaigning in Maine and the Act's limits with the high cost of presidential campaigns and FECA's limits. In 1976, Buckley found that
twenty million dollars was a reasonable amount to spend on presidential campaigns 400 and determined that a $1000 limit was constitutional
for these types of campaigns. 0 ' In the context of this federal system,
the Buckley approved maximum contribution equals only .01% of a
candidate's total expenditure.40 2 In contrast, the Act's limits do not
restrict candidates nearly as much as the Buckley approved limits. Indeed, campaigning in Maine costs only a fraction of the amount of
running a national campaign. In Maine, a state House campaign costs
less than $5000,403 a state Senate campaign costs about $25,000,404 and
narrowly tailored by showing that it is merely one-fifth of the limit upheld in
Buckley).
393. Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633, 643-44 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
2579 (1996).
394. Id.
395. Id. at 643 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 n.23 (1976)).
396. Id. at 643-44.
397. Telephone Interview with John Brautigam, Attorney, Maine Citizen Leadership Fund (Apr. 13, 1998).
398. Id.
399. Cf Carver, 72 F.3d at 643-44.
400. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 88 (1976). Note that this is a conservative
number because the costs of campaigns have risen considerably since 1976. Moreover, this is funding only for the general election; this number does not consider the
primary. See id.
401. Id. at 28-29.
402. Two thousand dollars (the per election limit) is only .01% of $20 million (2000/
20,000,000 = 0.01%).
403. Jack Beaudoin, Tax Form to Include Campaign Fund Box: Maine Legislative
Candidates Would Be Able to Use the Public Funds, Portland Press Herald, Feb. 2,
1998, at lB.
404. Id.
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a gubernatorial campaign costs about one million dollars."-' Under
these limits, the maximum contribution to a house candidate equals
10% of the candidate's spending406-an amount 1000 times greater
than Buckley." 7 Similarly, the maximum contribution to a Senate candidate ($500 per election cycle) equals 2% of his or her spending 4 osan amount 200 times greater than Buckley."° Lastly, the maximum
contribution to a gubernatorial candidate equals .1% of his or her
spending 41 0-an amount 10 times greater than Buckley. 4'" Therefore,
in the context of Maine elections, the Act's contribution limits are less
restrictive on candidates than the Buckley approved FECA limit because the Act's limit represents a much higher proportion of candidates' spending than the FECA approved limit. Thus, because the
limits are less restrictive on candidates, the difference cannot amount
to a difference "in kind."
In sum, a consideration of all of the quantitative and fact-specific
factors demonstrates that the Act's limit differs "in degree." As the
factors do not reveal inordinate differences, and even demonstrate
that the FECA approved limits are more restrictive than the Maine
limits, the difference cannot reasonably be interpreted to amount to
the excessive "in kind" difference that a court can strike down for not
meeting the narrowly tailored standard.
As Maine's limits constitute merely a difference "in degree," the
court must heed the limits prescribed by the drafters of the Act. Indeed, the court cannot brandish its "scalpel" to "fine tune" the limits.
As a result, Maine's limits are narrowly tailored to its compelling interests, and accordingly, the Act's limits steer clear of a First Amendment violation.
CONCLUSION

Not only is the Maine Clean Election Act constitutional, but it is

also wise policy. The current campaign financing system's distorting
effects on our system of representative democracy persist. While
many vow to "clean up the system," little meaningful reform has been
405. Telephone Interview with John Brautigam, Attorney, Maine Citizen Leadership Fund (Apr. 12, 1998).
406. Five hundred dollars (the per election limit) is 10% of S5000 (500!5000 =
10%).
407. 10% of a candidate's total spending is one thousand times greater than .01%
of a candidate's total spending (101.01% = 1000).
408. Five hundred dollars (the per election limit) is 2% of S25,000 (50025,000 =
2%).
409. 2% of a candidate's total spending is 200 hundred times greater than .01% of a
candidate's total spending (2/.01% = 200).
410. One thousand dollars (the per election limit) is .1% of SIJJ,000
(1000!
1,000,000 = .1%).

411. One tenth of a percent of a candidate's total spending is ten times greater than
.01% of a candidate's total spending (.11.01% = 10).
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implemented. The people of Maine took a significant step with the
passage of this Act.
Once the Act passes constitutional muster, and this Note has
demonstrated that it should, the end result will be a triumph of democracy over the disproportional representation of special interests.
Indeed, through implementation of the Act, the current impure financing practices will no longer distort representative democracy.

